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ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE BALTIC STATES
(percentage of total population, 1989 census)
Table 1: Ethnic Composition of ESTONIA
Ethnic origin %
Estonians 61.5
Russians 30.3
Ukrainians 3.1
Belarussians 1.8
Finns 1.1
Jews 0.3
Tatars 0.3
Germans 0.2
Latvians 0.2
Poles 0.2
Lithuanians 0.2
Others 0.9
Total 100.0
Source: Estonian Human Development Report 1995
(United Nations Development Programme, 1995).
Table 2: Ethnic Composition of LATVIA
Ethnic origin %
Latvians 52.0
Russians 34.0
Belarussians 4.5
Ukrainians 3.5
Poles 2.3
Other 3.7
Total 100.0
Source: Ethnosituâcija L tvijâ, Fakti un Komentâri
(Riga: LR Valsts Statistikas Komiteja and Zinantu Akademijas
Filozofijas and Sociologijas Instituts, 1994)
Table 3: Ethnic Composition of LITHUANIA
Ethnic origin %
Lithuanians 79.6
Russians 9.4
Poles 7.0
Belarussians 1.7
Ukrainians 1.2
Other 1.1
Total 100.0
Source: Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR
(Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991)
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1INTRODUCTION: THE OSCE AND MINORITIES
The importance of national minority questions has long been recognised by the Or anization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and this organisation has dealt with them
extensively.  Initially overshadowed by the East-West stand-off, minority issues were framed
exclusively in terms of individual human rights, in particular the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities.  In “post-Wall” Europe, however, the explosive potential of many of them
—e.g., in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus—became all too apparent.  It also became clear that in
this new era international violence would be mainly a consequence of domestic conflicts.
Moreover, soon after the break-up of the Soviet Union the issue of the ethnic Russians outside
the Russian Federation became an important factor in international relations in the OSCE area.
As a result, minority issues are now mainly seen from the angle of conflict prevention,
although this does include the continued pursuit of the implementation of human rights.
The importance the OSCE attaches to minority issues as problems of peace and security is
reflected most prominently in the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities
(HCNM) which was established in 1992 to prevent violent ethnic conflict.  Equally, it finds its
reflection in the mandates of most, if not all, of the long-term missions the OSCE has
established over the years, of which inter-ethnic issues are the main and sometimes exclusive
component.  These developments fit in the increased emphasis the OSCE has been putting on
conflict prevention, playing the role of an impartial, non-coercive third party.
Against this background, the tense inter-ethnic relations in Estonia and Latvia were addressed
early on by the OSCE.  Even though no inter-ethnic violence had taken place, a number of
factors made for a volatile mix in both Baltic states: firstly, the existence of domestic tensions
between a large minority of mainly Russians without citizenship who had to get used to post-
Soviet realities and a majority determined to preserve and strengthen its own identity; and
secondly, increasing international tensions because of the active interest which neighbouring
Russia, mainly for geopolitical reasons, was taking in the condition of its kinfolk in Estonia
and Latvia.  By contrast, these factors were absent in the third Baltic state, Lithuania.
As analysed in the following, the situations in Estonia and Latvia were typically cases for
which the OSCE High Commissioner had been established.  They demonstrate the extent to
which international involvement can keep domestic conflicts tractable—by helping the parties
to devise policies and positions which avoid an escalation of disputes and possibly
irreconcilable differences—and thus at the same time prevent the build-up of international
conflict potential.  They are also showcases for the specific approach the OSCE High
Commissioner has developed in dealing with tense inter-ethnic situations.  Although for
reasons of space the main emphasis of this paper will be on Estonia, it should be realised that
many similar issues are at stake in Latvia.
2I.  THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE1
1. Introduction
Starting in 1972 as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, or CSCE, the
OSCE was first intended as a meeting place where East and West, together with the neutral
and non-aligned states of Europe, would discuss a number of political, military, economic and
human rights issues.  With the momentous changes in the communist countries of the late
nineteen-eighties and nineties, the primary function of the OSCE changed to providing a
forum for comprehensive security discussions and being an agent of conflict prevention and
crisis management in the OSCE region with a special focus on the transition processes in
Central and Eastern Europe and the states on the territory of the former Soviet Union.2
Symbolic of the post-Cold War ambitions with regard to the OSCE were two steps.  In July
1992 the OSCE states declared their understanding of the CSCE as a regional arrangement in
the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.  A further step was the decision
of December 1993 to rename the Conference into Organ zation.3  (Originally consisting of a
loosely organised series of meetings, since 1990 the CSCE had already developed a light
structure of permanent institutions.  Hereafter, for the sake of convenience only the acronym
OSCE will be used.)
Employing a comprehensive or multidimensional approach to security, the OSCE works on
the basis of a body of political commitments and policy guidelines on matters in the
political, military and economic fields and regarding human rights and democracy.  The
OSCE states have agreed that these are all matters for legitimate international scrutiny.  The
commitments are not legally binding, but their political proscriptive and prescriptive force
is generally accepted—and invoked, if necessary—by the OSCE states.  Even though the
OSCE’s mechanism of consensus decision-taking is often cumbersome, once consensus is
reached it involves and binds all states politically.4  The non-coercive way in which the
OSCE usually operates is intended to enhance co-operation by the affected states.  (Of
course, there are cases where this approach does not work: witness former Yugoslavia.)
                                                                
1 For a concise introduction to the earlier OSCE, see Arie Blo d, “Two Decades of the CSCE Process: From
Confrontation to Cooperation. An Introduction”, in C ference on Security and Cooperation, Bloed, ed., pp. 1-
118.  More extensive coverage is provided by Victor-Yves Ghebali inLa diplomatie de la détente: la CSCE,
1973-1989 (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 1989) and  L’OSCE dans l’Europe post-communiste, 1990-1996. Vers une
identité paneuropéenne de sécurité (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 1996).
2 See e.g. Klaas Walraven, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of
International Organizations (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, February 1996), pp. 9-21, and “Inter-
governmental Organisations and Preventing Conflicts: Political Practice Since the End of the Cold War”, in
Early Warning and Conflict Prevention. Limitations and Possibilities (The Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer,
1998), Klaas van Walraven ed., pp.19-49.
3 See the Helsinki Summit Declaration, paragraph 25 (10 July 1992) and Budapest Summit Declaration,
paragraph 3 (6 December 1993).
4 Consensus is deemed to exist if no state raises a fundamental objection to a specific decision.
3Presided over at all levels by representatives of the Foreign Minister who is currently
Chairman-in-Office (the function rotates on an annual basis), the OSCE is in the first place
a forum for raising issues which have wider security and stability implications, including
bilateral issues.  The fact that such issues are being discussed in a multilateral setting is
understood in itself to have a dampening effect on certain situations or escalatory
developments.  The key operational body is the ambassador-level OSCE Permanent
Council in Vienna which is responsible for most decision-taking and day-to-day
management.  (The Council of Ministers meets only once a year and the Senior Council—
formerly known as Committee of Senior Officials or CSO and consisting of high-level
representatives from capitals—has declined in significance.)5
Secondly, and of equal importance, the OSCE undertakes a number of field activities on the
territory of member states.  Pre-eminent are the long-term on-site missions the OSCE has
established in a number of states for a variety of tasks, but very often with a strong
minority-related component in their mandates.6  They are established by consensus, i.e.
with the consent of the host country.  The OSCE also has other instruments at its disposal.
It deploys short-term fact-finding, rapporteur and expert missions.  Based in Warsaw, the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is the leading OSCE
institution with regard to assisting OSCE states in the implementation of their human
dimension commitments.7  Finally, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
is the personification of OSCE conflict prevention with regard to situations involving
national minorities.
Thus, the OSCE can act as an impartial third party or honest broker, serving as a go-
between or facilitator of compromises for parties to a dispute.  Also, the OSCE can function
as a politico-diplomatic interposition force when parties are very unequal in size and power,
as in the Baltic-Russian case.  Often, it will also work within states and within
governmental processes, as what Diana Chig s has termed an “insider third-party”.8  It is its
                                                                
5 For a discussion of these bodies see Arie Bloed, “The OSCE Political Bodies and their Role in Conflict
Prevention and Crisis Management”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security.  Conflict
Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Michael Bo he, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan
Rosas, eds., (The Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1997), pp. 35-52.
6 For a summary of mission mandates see the OSCE Handbook (2nd ed., Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, 1996),
pp. 17-41, and Allan Rosas and Timo Lahelma, “OSCE Long-term Mission”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of
Peace and Security, Bothe et al., eds., pp. 167-190.  All OSCE documents referred to in this paper can be found
on the OSCE Website at “http://www.osceprag.cz”.  See The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993 , Arie Bloed, ed., (2nd ed., Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1993) and The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995, ed.
Arie Bloed (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), and the English-language quarterly Helsinki
Monitor.
7 The human dimension encompasses all human rights and fundamental freedoms, human contacts and
other issues of a related humanitarian character, democracy, democratic institutions and the rule of law.
8 Diana Chigas, with Elizabeth McClintock and Christophe Kamp, “Preventive Diplomacy and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation”, in
Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World. Mobilizing International and Regional Org nizations,
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., (Washington (D.C.): The Brookings Institution 1996) pp.
25-97.
4emphasis on a preventive, thematically broad and non-coercive approach to security, its use
of politico-diplomatic tools and the inclusiveness of its membership9 that give the OSCE a
distinct identity and role in respect to the other intergovernmental organisations active in
Europe.
2. The OSCE and national minorities10
The OSCE is a political organisation employing primarily political and diplomatic tools.  As
such, it is in principle well suited to address national minority issues.  These issues are by their
very nature highly political, requiring a primarily political approach in which legal
considerations, including human rights, and sometimes economic factors must be embedded.
Often they are intimately connected to the existence of states, touching upon the relationship
between regions and the centre, border issues and the territorial integrity of states.  Also, they
often have to do with the self-awareness of groups of people.  An important factor in many
concrete situations are political, social and economic processes of transition and the pain
which often accompanies them.
As a matter of fact, many of the OSCE’s activities are focused on situations in which minority
issues are at the core of the problem complex to be addressed.  The mandates of most, if not
all, long-term missions are a reflection of this, as is of course the mandate of the High
Commissioner.  At the same time, minority issues are among the most controversial with
which the OSCE has had to come to grips.
The main normative achievements of the OSCE with regard to national minorities are
contained in just a few documents.11  The Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 197512 contains a list
of ten Principles guiding relations between participating states.  Of particular relevance to
minority issues are Principles VII (Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) and
IV (Territorial integrity of States).13  The fourth paragraph of Principle VII deals with the
protection of persons belonging to national minorities (equality before the law and enjoyment
of their human rights and fundamental freedoms).
                                                                
9 There are fifty-four OSCE participating states in all (the United States, Canada, all states on the
territory of the former Soviet Union and all other European states), Yugoslavia (FRY—Serbia and
Montenegro) having been suspended from participation since 8 July 1992.
10 A short introduction to the OSCE and minority issues is offered by Kate Birmingham, The OSCE and
Minority Issues (The Hague: Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, November 1995) and Arie Bloed, “The
CSCE and the Issue of National Minorities”, in Universal Minority Rights, Alan Philips and Allan Rosas,
eds.,  (Turku/Åbo/London, 1995), pp. 113-122.
11 For an overview and analysis of the OSCE commitments concerning persons belonging to national
minorities, see Jan Helgesen, “Protecting Minorities in the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE)
Process”, International Journal on Group Rights  2:1 (1994), 1-34.  Also of interest is Alexis Heraclides, “The
CSCE and Minorities. The Negotiations behind the Commitments, 1972-1992”, Helsinki Monitor 3:3 (Fall 1992),
5-18.
12 Full title is Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.
13  OSCE documents do not establish a link between national minorities issues and the right to self-
determination (Principle VIII). For a more extensive treatment of this subject in relation to the OSCE, see Rob
Zaagman, “Commentary”, in Self-Determination and Self-Administration. A Sourcebook, Wolfgang
Danspeckgruber and Arthur Watts, eds., (Boulder (Col.)/London: Lynne Riener, 1997), pp. 248-254.
5After Helsinki, by far the most important standard-setting text on national minority issues
within the OSCE (and beyond)14 was Chapter IV of the Copenhagen Document (1990),15
although it does contain a number of qualifying phrases and escape clauses.  Several elements
stand out.  Firstly, it is recognised that “questions relating to national minorities can only be
satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law.”
Secondly, the question of definition is addressed—although not determined—in so far as it is
established that “to belong to a national minority is a matter of a person’s individual choice
and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice.”16  As other international
organisations, the OSCE does not have a commonly agreed definition of what constitutes a
national minority.17  Although this state of affairs is perhaps unsatisfactory from a legal point
of view, it does allow room for political manoeuvre when dealing with issues involving
national minority questions.
Thirdly, specific rights are elaborated to an extent which was hitherto unknown in the OSCE
context, including the right to use the minority’s mother tongue in public, to learn it and to be
educated in it.  The individual rights approach is clearly dominant although there are some
provisions with a collective dimension.  (These do not, however, establish collective rights
within the OSCE.)
However, after the Copenhagen Meeting it became clear that the window of opportunity for
achieving consensus on new norms regarding national minorities had closed.  The Geneva
Report (1991) mainly reaffirmed existing commitments.18 Much of the effort at Geneva had to
go into safeguarding what had been achieved earlier.  A new element was the expressed right
of persons belonging to national minorities to be free from assimilation against their will.
Importantly, it stated that “Issues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with
international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to
them, are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute
exclusively an internal affair of the respective State.” (Chapter II).  This built upon a process
of increasing legitimate involvement of the OSCE states in each other’s domestic affairs,
which essentially started with the beginnings of the OSCE itself.19
                                                                
14 It served as the primary source of inspiration to the drafters of the Council of Europe Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) and influenced the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic minorities (1992).  S e John Packer, “On
the Content of Minority Rights”, in Do We Need Minority Rights?, Juha Räikkä, ed., (The Hague/Boston/
London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), pp. 121-178 at p. 162.
15 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE
(Copenhagen, 29 June 1990).
16 Paragraphs 30 and 32, respectively.
17 See also John Packer, “Problems in Defining Minorities”, in Minority and Group Rights Toward the
New Millennium, B. Bowring and D. Fottrell, eds., (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, forthcoming).
18 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities(Geneva, 19 July 1991).  Originally
not intended as a binding document in its own right, the Geneva Report was confirmed in the Moscow
Document of the September 1991 Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE
(paragraph 37) and endorsed by the January 1992 Prague meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council
(paragraph 16 of the Summary of Conclusions).
19 See Rob Zaagman and Hannie Zaal, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities:
6Subsequent OSCE meetings did not go beyond confirming previous commitments, with one
notable exception.  Confronted with ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, the Helsinki
Document of 1992 stated that the OSCE states would “refrain from resettling and condemn all
attempts, by the threat or use of force, to resettle persons with the aim of changing the ethnic
composition of areas within their territories.”20  The major developments regarding minority
issues took place in the institutional field, most prominently the establishment of the position
of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Prehistory and Negotiations”, in The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its
Aftermath, Arie Bloed, ed., (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff 1994), pp. 95-111.
20 CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change (Helsi ki, 10 July 1992), Chapter VI,
paragraph 37.
7II.  THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES:
MANDATE AND PRACTICE
1.  Introduction
The only specifically minority-related OSCE body is the OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities (HCNM) which was established in July 1992 at the proposal of the
Netherlands.21  The first High Commissioner—Max van der Stoel, a former Foreign Minister
of the Netherlands—was appointed by the OSCE Council of Ministers in December 1992 and
started work on 1 January 1993.  He was reappointed in December 1995.  Although the
mandate provides for two three-year terms only, the OSCE states have decided to extend Van
der Stoel’s mandate by another year (after having ascertained his willingness), but expressly
without establishing a precedent.
The establishment of the post of HCNM was a response by the OSCE states to their inability
to prevent the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus.  It fit into the increased emphasis
which the OSCE states in general were placing on domestic and international conflict
prevention and crisis management and more specifically on contentious minority issues.
Thus, the High Commissioner is defined as an instrument of international conflict prevention
who will provide “early warning” and “early action” at the earliest possible stage in regard to
those tensions involving national minority issues which, in his22 judgement, have the potential
to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area which could affect peace, stability or relations
between OSCE states.23
The HCNM was not intended as a human rights instrument nor as a protector of the individual
or group rights of persons belonging to national minorities.  To make the point, for the title of
the post the preposition “on” was chosen instead of “for”.  A further reflection of this point is
the fact that the HCNM is explicitly precluded from considering violations of OSCE
commitments with regard to an individual person belonging to a national minority.24
However, situations with which the High Commissioner has had to deal contain many human
rights aspects, so that his activities generally do have a positive effect on the implementation
of rights of persons belonging to national minorities, including general human rights.
                                                                
21 See Zaagman and Zaal, “CSCE High Commissioner”, p. 97.
22 Although a woman could of course also occupy the post, for convenience sake the words “he” and “his”
shall be used.
23 Articles 2 and 3, Chapter II of the Helsinki Decisions of July 1992.  For a comprehensive analysis of the
HCNM mandate see Rob Zaagman, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: An Analysis of the
Mandate and the Institutional Context”, in Challe ges of Change, Bloed, ed., pp. 113-175.  A concise and more
recent overview is The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention. An
Introduction, ed. Joanne Thorburn and Rob Zaagman (The Hague: Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, June
1997). See also María Amor Martínez Estébanez, “The High Commissioner on National Minorities: The
Development of the Mandate”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, Bothe et al., eds., pp.
123-165.
24 Also excluded are situations involving organised acts of terrorism (Article 5b, Chapter II, Helsinki
Decisions).
8Since January 1993, High Commissioner Van d  Stoel has addressed the following situations:
the Greek minority in southern Albania; minorities in Croatia, in particular Serbs; Estonia,
primarily with regard to the Russians living there; the Albanian population of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the Slovak minority in Hungary; inter-ethnic relations in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; Latvia, primarily with regard to the Russians living there;
Lithuania (the High Commissioner has terminated his involvement in that country); various
minority issues in Moldova; Romania, in particular concerning the Hungarian minority; the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia; and Ukraine, in particular the situation in Crimea.
2.  Mandate
The mandate of the OSCE High Commissioner reflects the recognition of the political nature
of minority issues.  The High Commissioner's tasks are framed in political terms and his tools
are essentially tailored to deal with political issues, although out of necessity legal factors are
included as well.  He has to find compromises which will be accepted by all parties directly
concerned and which answer to the requirements of the concrete situation.  High
Commissioner Van der Stoel has employed a pragmatic political approach, trying to identify,
first, the main causes of tension and to explore, second, the possibilities for mutually
acceptable first steps to removing these causes.  Often, he will reinforce his recommendations
with comments relating to the political aspects of the overall situation.
Van der Stoel’s emphasis has been on persuasion and co-operation rather than coercion,
working with governments as a typical “insider third party” rather than as an outsider
imposing solutions.25   In his view, presented in numerous speeches and articles,26 durable
solutions to the issues he is dealing with are only possible if there is a sufficient measure of
consent and co-operation on the side of those directly concerned.  Sometimes he finds that
he can only facilitate the beginning of a process of rapprochement and reconciliation.  At
other times, if the political situation allows it, he may lead the parties to specific solutions.
Putting a premium on a tactful diplomatic manner, he makes suggestions and
recommendations and tries to avoid language that could give the impression of being an
instruction or decree.  This reflects the basic conviction of the HCNM that in the vast
majority of cases durable progress depends on the willingness of the authorities in question
to co-operate, and that co-operation and compromise cannot be forced upon the parties.
Nevertheless, HCNM Van derStoel also devotes considerable effort to marshalling support
for his recommendations among other OSCE states, both with a view to generating
assistance for the government at which his recommendations are aimed and to increase
their authority in the eyes of the addressee (and, if need be, involve other states in changing
its policies).
                                                                
25 Chigas, “Preventive Diplomacy and the OSCE”, pp. 51-56.
26 See the Bibliography of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.  Documents, Speeches
and Related Publications (The Hague: Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, March 1997).  See also the
HCNM’s report to the OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension issues, 12-28 November 1997,
in Helsinki Monitor 9:1 (1997), pp. 68-76.
9An integral aspect of this approach is that the HCNM makes conscious efforts to show that he
is aware of the many sensitivities involved in the situation under scrutiny.  On the one hand, if
many human rights commentators will typically focus exclusively on the concerns of
individuals or minority groups seen to be under pressure, the HCNM is mindful of the
concerns of the majority and the government as well.  He has repeatedly emphasised that
efforts by both sides are needed, not just by the government.  On the other hand, the HCNM
very often refers to the concerns and uncertainties with which the non-citizens are faced, both
in general terms and with regard to specific pieces of legislation or administrative practices.
Still, this is done almost exclusively from the perspective of conflict prevention and stability
building.
Eventually, the HCNM will formulate (non-binding) recommendations for the state concerned
—although not necessarily after each and every visit—and will ensure the necessary follow-
up, including through subsequent visits.27 The government will respond and subsequently the
Permanent Council will discuss the issue, generally expressing its support for the activities of
the High Commissioner and encouraging him to continue his activities.  (This procedure is not
contained in the mandate but has evolved in practice.)
A limitation to the High Commissioner’s mandate is that he cannot issue formal
recommendations to the minorities in question, nor is he equipped to do grass-roots work.  In
his consultations with their representatives—if there are such representatives—he will, if
necessary, try to influence their thinking on relevant issues.  However, with minorities this can
only be an informal process.  This state of affairs is a reflection of the fact that the OSCE is an
organisation which is operating almost exclusively on the intergovernmental level. (It should
be noted that the HCNM co-operates closely with the non-governmental Foundation on Inter-
Ethnic Relations which is co-located with his office and which increasingly undertakes project
work and other activities at decentralised and non-governmental levels.)
It is interesting to note that OSCE states will often make reference to the HCNM’s
recommendations in their bilateral contacts with states in which the HCNM works.  The
European Union (EU), for instance, has used his recommendations to Estonia and Latvia as
benchmarks both in its discussions with those states, including on their applications for EU
membership,28 and in its efforts to restrain the Russian Federation in its statements and
behaviour towards these Baltic states.
For an effective functioning of the High Commissioner in a given case, the following aspects
of the mandate would seem essential: (1) an adequate mix of independence from and
accountability to the OSCE states; (2) sufficient access to political support within the OSCE if
needed; (3) confidentiality, providing the possibility of low-profile preventive diplomacy; and
                                                                
27 The HCNM’s country reports and recommendations to governments and those governments’ replies
can be obtained from the OSCE Secretariat or the OSCE website at http://www.osceprag.cz.  A number have
been published in the Helsinki Monitor and are also available on the MINELRES (Minority Electronic
resources) website at “http://www.riga.lv/minelres/osce/counrec.htm.”
28 They are also reflected in the Opinions of the European Commission on Estonia’s and Latvia’s
applications for EU membership.
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(4) sufficient latitude in the choice of interlocutors who can provide information and
assessments regarding a particular situation.
The High Commissioner himself decides which situations he wants to become involved in and
when.  He has the competence to travel to a state without the explicit consent of either the
OSCE—whose decision would be subject to the consensus rule—or the visited state.  He is
equally free in his choice of interlocutors, either within the country in question or elsewhere.
Typically, he will also consult with the government of what may be called the kin-state of the
minority in question, e.g., Russia or Hungary in cases where a Russian or Hungarian minority,
respectively, is involved.  After each visit (or round of visits), the High Commissioner
provides the OSCE Chairman-in-Office with a strictly confidential report on his findings and
the progress of his involvement, as required by the mandate.  The Chairman-in-Office is his
formal link with the OSCE states.
The politically most powerful instrument of the High Commissioner is the possibility of
involving the whole of the OSCE, generally through the OSCE Permanent Council.  Partly,
this is decreed by the mandate.  If in spite of his involvement, a situation escalates towards
conflict or when he thinks there is a prima facie risk of potential conflict, the HCNM will have
to alert the OSCE states as a whole, e.g., by issuing a formal message of “early warning”.  So
far, this has not happened.  The HCNM can also turn to the OSCE states to ask for political (or
financial) support with regard to a certain follow-up activity or if a state proves to be non-co-
operative.  In addition, Van der Stoel maintains contacts of varying intensity with individual
OSCE states and groups of states, in the first place the EU.
The High Commissioner works behind the scenes, avoiding publicity unless it serves the
purposes of his activities.  Sometimes, he has considered it necessary to make statements to
the media on substantial matters, but this was generally done with the explicit agreement of
the parties concerned.  A case in point was his press conference in Tallinn on 12 July 1993, in
which he announced the results of his mediation efforts between the Estonian Government
and the local authorities of the city of Narva (see below).
The mandate also provides for the possibility of the involvement of experts to assist the High
Commissioner to travel with him on his fact-finding missions.  Of a different nature are two
other types of involvement of experts.  Firstly, the HCNM has sometimes engaged experts to
discuss a particular situation, e.g., Crimea, or a specific theme, like education and minority
languages.  Such discussions may involve representatives of minorities and of governments.
Secondly, he has sometimes involved specialists in dispute resolution to facilitate confidence-
building meetings between representatives of various ethnic groups.
The HCNM's mandate constituted a major step forward in the increasing, legitimate OSCE
role in the internal affairs of the OSCE states.  Since 1992, the mandate has not changed,
although there have been proposals, primarily by Russia, to amend it e.g., by making the
recommendations of the High Commissioner binding and requiring governments to report to
the OSCE on the state of their implementation.  However, the present HCNM has not
welcomed such efforts.  Indeed, established practice has followed an expansive interpretation
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of the mandate which was routinely endorsed by the Permanent Council.  The mandate as it
stands provided sufficient flexibility for him to operate effectively and a change could lead to
more restrictions.  Moreover, the Russian proposals were not compatible with his strong
preference for a non-coercive approach.
3.  Normative frame of reference
The mandate stipulates that the High Commissioner has to base his work on OSCE principles
and commitments.29  As his primary task is to prevent conflict, reference to OSCE norms is
limited to those which are relevant to that task in a given situation.  On the one hand, in
practice quite a range of OSCE standards have been of relevance to situations with which
the HCNM has been dealing, in particular those relating to minorities (see above) but also
more general human dimension norms.  On the other hand, OSCE commitments do not
necessarily cover all issues relevant to a particular situation.  In such instances, High
Commissioner Van der Stoel has used norms contained in other international instruments as
points of reference, in particular declarations and treaties elaborated in the frameworks of
the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the International Labour Organisation.30
The HCNM will in certain recommendations refer to specific international legal obligations
assumed by the state in question, implying that the government would violate these
obligations if it were to ignore those recommendations.  A case in point is the question of
stateless children born on the territory of Estonia and Latvia (see below).  Also, he will
sometimes make reference to state practice within the OSCE area, mainly of member states
of the European Union or the Council of Europe.
The recommendations of the High Commissioner himself have been written for specific
situations and cannot readily be used in other cases.  However, a number of broad themes
arise out of these recommendations, and experiences in one case have helped the HCNM
formulate recommendations in others.  Also, with regard to the issues of educational and
linguistic rights of minorities the HCNM has stimulated the drafting of guidelines (see
below).
Since there is no OSCE definition of the term “national minority”, High Commissioner Van
der Stoel has had to decide for himself which groups he sees as national minorities.
Underlining that the existence of a minority is a question of fact and not of definition, he has
referred on various occasions to the C penhagen Document of 1990 which states that to
belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice (paragraph 32).
Although he has stated that he would know a minority when he saw one, he also gave some
characteristics which focused on the issue of identity.  First of all, in his view a minority is a
group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which distinguish it from the majority.
Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also
                                                                
29 Article 4.
30 Article 6 of the mandate opens the possibility for this.  Moreover, starting with Principle X of the
Helsinki Final Act of 1975 - “Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law” - many OSCE
commitments expressly refer to international law or, more specifically, international human rights law.
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tries to give stronger expression to that identity.31
Somewhat of a problem for the HCNM could have been the adjective “national” which
seems to imply that only citizens of the state concerned belong to a national minority.
(However, OSCE documents do not contain an explicit limitation of this kind.)32  T us,
situations involving non-citizens or alleged non-citizens would be excluded from the High
Commissioner's scrutiny.  However, in some situations—e.g., Estonia and Latvia—the
issue of citizenship is precisely one of the main causes of the tensions which the High
Commissioner should address.  It would be contrary to the very concept of the HCNM’s
mandate if a state could bar the High Commissioner from taking up such an issue by
maintaining that the requirement of citizenship had not been fulfilled.  In the case of the
Baltic states, the interpretation of the term “national” mentioned above was not used to
ward off the HCNM’s involvement, although the Estonian Foreign Minister did use it in a
discussion with the HCNM about Estonia’s interpretation of the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe.33
4.  General themes
As far as the general subject-matter of his analyses and recommendations is concerned, like
the OSCE as a whole the High Commissioner has taken a comprehensive approach to security,
including in his analysis all elements he determined were connected to the root causes of the
problems before him, especially those linking the domestic and international spheres.  The
HCNM has also devoted attention to the lack of economic or financial resources on the part of
states with minority issues and encouraged other governments to provide humanitarian aid,
expertise or financial assistance.  As another example of linkage between the domestic and
international spheres, the HCNM has sometimes called upon OSCE states to take steps, e.g., to
recognise the aliens’ passports issued by Estonia and Latvia as valid travel documents (see
below).
Against this general background, there are some main areas, often interlinked, o  which the
HCNM has focused his analyses and recommendations:34
Identity, or  the right of each person to determine, maintain and develop his or her identity free
from prescription or coercion.  This issue raises questions of the use of language, culture,
education, the status and use of names, etc.  With regard to language, the High Commissioner
took the initiative for expert consultations with a view to establishing “recommendations on an
                                                                
31 HCNM’s keynote address to the OSCE seminar on case-studies on national minorities in Warsaw, 24-
28 May 1993.  Reprinted in the ODIHR Bulletin 1:3 (Fall 1993), 22-25.
32 See Zaagman, “CSCE High Commissioner”, pp. 133-135.
33 Estonia stated that the Convention only applied to citizens.  See reply of 27 November 1996 by Acting
Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijärv to the letter by the HCNM of 28 October 1996.
34 Based on John Packer, “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities” in Human Rights
Monitoring Procedures: A Textbook on How to Petition and Lobby International Orga izations. Liber
Amicorum for Jacob Möller, Gudmundur  Alfredsson, Göran Melander and B. Ramcharan, eds., (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, forthcoming).
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appropriate and coherent application of the linguistic rights of persons belonging to national
minorities.”   As a result the so-called Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights
of National Minorities were drafted.35
Education is essential to minorities for transmitting and maintaining their identity over the
generations.  Again, language, both as language of instruction and as subject of instruction,
figures prominently.  (This is equally true, of course, for small nations under occupation, like
Estonia and Latvia in the Soviet era.)   Since education for and/or by minorities has been the
subject of considerable attention in almost every situation in which the HCNM is involved, he
has stimulated consultations among independent experts which resulted in their adoption of
The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities.36
Political participation is another core issue in the situations which the High Commissioner has
addressed.  His main document of reference on this issue is the OSCE Copenhagen Document
which states that persons belonging to national minorities should enjoy “effective participation
in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion
of the identity of such minorities.” (paragraph 35).
The issue of citizenship is a particular aspect of political participation, but also of importance
with regard to economic questions such as the right to own property or to participate in
privatisation programmes.  It entails equality within the polity, in particular equality before the
law.  Citizenship demonstrates on the part of the individual the wish to be part of the wider
society and his loyalty to the state.  In Estonia and Latvia, the citizenship laws have had the
effect—intentional or not—of excluding the overwhelming majority of persons belonging to
national minorities despite their long or very long permanent residence or even being born on
the territory of the state.
Access to resources, including access to employment, to governmental contracts, etc.  For
non-citizens who are long-term residents—and taxpayers—it is also a question of access to
social security benefits.   Financial resources—i.e., government subsidies—are needed to
effectively exercise for instance cultural or educational rights.  Sometimes, governments will
use this dependence to put pressure on minorities.
High Commissioner Van der Stoel has been very reluctant to propose te rit rial solutions for
minority issues.  States are mostly not willing to contemplate such arrangements, as is
reflected in OSCE norms and OSCE state practice which give little support for claims to
territorial autonomy (let alone secession).37  Neither would it be a real solution in view of the
many minorities in Europe and their geographical distribution.  Therefore, the HCNM has
stated on various occasions that solutions should be found as much as possible within the
framework of the state itself, often emphasising various options of decentralisation and
                                                                
35 Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory Note
(The Hague: Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, February 1998).
36 International Journal of Minority and Group Rights 4:2 (1996/97), 202-205 (Special Issue on the
Education Rights of National Minorities).
37  Zaagman, “Commentary”.
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subsidiarity in decision-making.38  Efforts should be directed towards strengthening the
democratic framework as the basis for the prevention of violations of rights of persons
belonging to national minorities, for the effective participation in public life of all groups and
for channelling and resolving the conflicts of interest which exist in all societies.  In Van der
Stoel’s view, self-realisation as a minority could often be accomplished through legislation
promoting the development of the identity of the minority in various fields, for instance
culture, education, local government, etc.  In very specific cases, arrangements like strong
local government or even territorial autonomy could be envisaged.  In some exceptional cases,
the High Commissioner has explored the possibilities of local or regional autonomy, e.g., in
Crimea.39
In general, HCNM Van der Stoel has encouraged various forms of structured dialogue
between the authorities and minority representatives so that these parties would interact and
also find solutions on their own, such as inter-ethnic councils or the expansion of existing
forms of participation of national minorities in decision-making processes.  Furthermore, he
has analysed existing and draft legislation, policies and administrative practices as part of his
overall analysis of a situation with a view to determining the sources of tension between
minorities and governmental authorities, and has suggested changes to them.40
                                                                
38 For a recent expression of his position in this regard, see Max van d r Stoel, The Role and Importance
of Integrating Diversity, address to the conference “Governance and Participation: Integrating Diversity”,
Locarno, 18 October 1998.
39 John Packer, “Autonomy within the OSCE: The Case of Crimea”, in Autonomy: Applications and
Implications, Markku Suksi, ed., (The Hague: Kluwer International Law, 1998), pp. 295-316.
40 Based on Packer, “OSCE High Commissioner”, pp. 8-9.
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III.  THE OSCE AND THE BALTIC STATES
1.  Introduction
From the beginnings of the OSCE process in 1972, attention had been given to the situation of
the Baltic states.  Many Western states had never accepted their annexation by the Soviet
Union.41  The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 declared in the last paragraph of Principle IV about
the territorial integrity of states: “The participating States will likewise refrain from making
each other’s territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of
force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such
measures or the threat of them.  No such occupation or acquisition will be recog ized as
legal.”  According to the American OSCE diplomat John J. Maresca “This language was
inserted by the West partly to maintain the principle that Stalin’s annexation of the Baltic
states [in 1940] will not be recognized.” 42  Thus, while the principle of the territorial integrity
of each OSCE state was confirmed, the consequences of past or future military occupation
were declared illegal.
Nevertheless, for political reasons the attitude of Western states in general remained
ambivalent regarding the position of the Baltic states within the Soviet Union.  At various
OSCE meetings, the situation in the Baltic states was raised, but mainly from a strictly human
rights perspective.  There was little enthusiasm to raise the issue of Baltic independence and a
marked reluctance to do so during the period of Go bachev, whose position many Western
governments did not want to jeopardise.  From 1989 onward, there had been repeated attempts
to secure Baltic representation at OSCE meetings, each of which was blocked by the Soviet
Union.  For example, after strong Soviet protests including the threat of Soviet non-
participation the French Government withdrew its earlier invitation to Baltic representatives to
participate in the Paris Summit of November 1990.43  As an alternative, Baltic representatives
were sometimes included as members of some Western delegations.
Matters changed in the course of 1991.  The bloody repression in Riga and Vilnius by Soviet
OMON troops in January 1991 caused the neutral states together with Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland to request a special meeting of the OSCE, which was rejected by the
Soviet Union.44  An attempt was also made by Austria and other states to invoke the so-called
human dimension mechanism with a view to compelling Moscow to discuss these incidents
within the OSCE.  The Soviet Union rejected this step as inadmissible interference in its
                                                                
41 See, however, W.A. Timmermans, “The Baltic States, the Soviet Union and the Netherlands: A
Historic Note”, in Netherlands International Law Review 32 (1985), 288-294 for the argument that only the
United States pursued a consistent policy of non-recognition, i.e. de iure as well as de facto.
42 John J. Maresca, “The People Have A Right To Choose”, in Int rnational Herald Tribune, 21 June
1989; reprinted in Vojtech Mastný, The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986-1991.
Analysis and Documentation (L don: Pinter Publishers, 1992), Institute for East-West Security Studies, pp.
187-189.
43 Falk Lange, “Die baltischen Staaten und die KSZE” [The Baltic states and the CSCE], in Osteuropa
44:3 (March 1994), 232-241, at 237.
44 Lange, “Die baltischen Staaten”, 237.
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internal affairs.45  After the coup in Moscow in August 1991, things changed dramatically.
The Baltic states regained their independence and were admitted as participating states of the
OSCE at an additional meeting of the OSCE Council of Ministers on 10 September 1991 in
Moscow, just prior to the beginning of the OSCE human dimension meeting in that city.46
However, a number of fundamental and contentious issues remained outstanding, in particular
the continued presence of Soviet (later: Russian) troops in the Baltic states and the position of
the hundreds of thousands of non-indigenous persons who had moved to the Baltic states in
Soviet times and their descendants.
During the 1992 OSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Helsinki, the Baltic representatives used every
opportunity to raise the issue of the continued presence of foreign troops on their territory and
the urgent need for their withdrawal.  For example, when environmental issues were discussed
they eventually turned the subject towards the detrimental environmental effects of the ageing
Soviet nuclear submarine fleet and then demanded the withdrawal of these and other military
units.47
Russia initially declined to discuss these questions in the OSCE framework with the argument
that they were bilateral issues which had no place on the agenda of the multilateral OSCE.
However, it soon found that it could not continue to dodge the issue.  It then proceeded to link
the withdrawal of the troops to the position of the Russians and other non-Baltic people in the
independent Baltic states, in particular Estonia and Latvia,48 a linkage it maintained until the
last troops had left the Baltic states.49
The main reason for Russia’s interest in its kinsmen in the Baltic states was military-strategic
rather than the fate of these Russians.  This is not to say that the latter could not have been a
factor as well. 50  After all, many Estonians and Latvians looked with distrust if not hostility
upon that portion of the non-indigenous population—the vast majority of which had settled in
their countries during the Soviet period.  Russian strategic motives were, however, paramount.
The early-warning radar station at Skrunda, Latvia, was Russia’s Western-most  land-based
element of its strategic anti-missile defence.51  Its military installations in the Baltic states were
                                                                
45 More on the human dimension mechanism and its application in Rob Z agman, “Institutional Aspects of
the CSCE Human Dimension After Helsinki-II”, in The Challenges of Change.  The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE
and its Aftermath, Arie Bloed, ed., (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 231-281 at p. 237.
46 The Decision is contained in the Journal of the Additional Meeting of the Council (Moscow, 10
September 1991), paragraph 4.  See also Bloed, “Two Decades”, pp. 105-106.
47 See various articles in Challenges of Change, Bloed, ed., and  the report The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, March 24-July 8, 1992 (Washington: Commission on
Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), pp. 48-49.
48 Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and Its Aftermath.  The Making of the CSCE into an International
Organisation (London/New York: Pinter, 1993), p. 139.
49 Lange, “Die baltischen Staaten”,  239.
50 Russia also pursued this issue vigorously within the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS).  See Ole
Espersen, “Human Rights Protection in the Baltic Sea Area. The Commissioner on Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights including the Rights of Persons belonging to Minorities”, in Helsinki Monitor 7:2 (1996),
52-64 at 54.
51 See e.g. chapter 3.4. “Command and Control System and Its Current Status”, in Nuclear Arms
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very important to projecting Russian naval power in the Baltic sea area.  And finally, the
Baltic states had made no secret of their desire to join Western institutions, in the first place
NATO and the EU.  No doubt maintaining a military presence in the Baltic states was seen in
Moscow as one way of preventing that from happening.  After the withdrawal of troops, the
position of the Russian residents, in particular in Estonia and Latvia, gave Russia a legitimate
basis to remain involved in those Baltic states.
Eventually, the H lsinki Summit Declaration of July 1992 stated the following with regard to
the Russian troops in the Baltic states:
“Even where violence has been contained, the sovereignty and independence of some States
still needs to be upheld.  We express support for efforts by CSCE participating States to
remove, in a peaceful manner and through negotiations, the problems that remain from the
past, like the stationing of foreign armed forces on the territories of the Baltic States without
the required consent of those countries.
Therefore, in line with basic principles of international law and in order to prevent any
possible conflict, we call on the participating States concerned to conclude, without delay,
appropriate bilateral agreements, including timetables, for the early, orderly and complete
withdrawal of such foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic States.”52
After the Helsinki meeting, the issues of the troop withdrawals and the position of the non-
indigenous populations remained a source of constant friction between Russia and the Baltic
states, in particular Estonia and Latvia, and tensions flared up time and again.  In response to
these tensions, the OSCE became involved in these issues in several ways.  Until the last
military units had been withdrawn, there was constant attention devoted to the issue of troop
withdrawals during OSCE discussions, including at the levels of senior officials and
ministers.53  In this way, the issue was not just left in the bilateral sphere where parties were of
greatly unequal strength.  (Although it is hard to determine exactly how important this
multilateral scrutiny was to the resolution of the issue in addition to the bilateral pressure
exerted by the US and the EU.)54
The OSCE became involved in other, more direct ways as well.  Apart from sending short-
term diplomatic delegations, the OSCE decided to establish long-term missions first in Estonia
(deployed on 15 February 1993) and then in Latvia (19 November 1993).  The organisation
also assumed a role in the commissions dealing with issues relating to military pensioners of
the Soviet/Russian army who had remained in Estonia and Latvia.  Furthermore, in 1994 it
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Reduction: The Process and Problems, A. S. Diakov, ed., (Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy and
Environmental Studies, June).  The entire report can be found at
“http://blue.iris.mipt.ru/iso/reductions/main.htm”.
52 Paragraph 15.
53 Decisions of the Stockholm Meeting of the CSCE Council of 15 December 1992, the Declaration on
Baltic Issues of the Rome Council (30 November-1 December 1993), and the Budapest Summit Meeting of 6
December 1994.
54 Lange is quite sceptical about this: “Die baltischen Staaten”, 239.
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agreed to assist Latvia and the Russian Federation in monitoring the implementation of the
agreement which granted Russia the right to temporarily continue using the Skrunda radar
station.  To conclude the list, already in January 1993 the OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities paid the first of many visits to the Baltic states.
2. The OSCE in Estonia: long-term mission and military pensioners 55
On 13 December 1992, the OSCE decided to establish a mission for an initial period of six
months in Estonia56 (subsequently extended by six-month periods).  This was done following
the advice of an OSCE delegation which had visited Estonia in early December 1992 and had
issued a report with recommendations at the end of  that month.57  (Al hough the visit had
taken place at the request of Estonia, apparently the US had strongly suggested that the
Estonian Government issue that invitation.)58  The Mission was deployed on 15 February
1993 in Tallinn and subsequently established offices in Kohtla-Järve and Narva.
The mandate of the OSCE Mission to Estonia is to promote stability, dialogue and
understanding between the Estonian and Russian communities in Estonia.  (The communities
were not mentioned in the mandate by name, but it was clear which were meant.)  The
Mission works in close co-operation with the authorities and maintains contacts with relevant
non-governmental groups.  The Mission exchanges information and co-operates on relevant
questions with the ODIHR and, in questions falling within his competence, with the High
Commissioner.  It reports regularly to the OSCE Permanent Council (typically, every
fortnight).
The provision on co-ordination is of importance, in view of the considerable overlap in
competencies between the Mission and the HCNM.  The Mission is mandated to provide
advice and assistance with regard to the integration of the non-indigenous population of
Estonia.  In that context, it has monitored the process of the implementation of legislation
concerning non-citizens, including questions relating to the implementation and amendment of
the Law on Aliens (entry into force early July 1995).  It supported the proposal made by the
Estonian Government and adopted in June 1994 by the Estonian Parliament to extend by one
year the deadline for the registration of non-citizens applying for Estonian residency, which in
the Law on Aliens was put at 12 July 1994.  The Mission also monitored developments related
to citizenship issues, such as the adoption of the Citizenship Law which took place in January
                                                                
55 Based on Klaus Törnudd, “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy – The case of
Estonia” and Timo Lahelma, “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy – The case of
Estonia (August 1993-June 1994)” in The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE,
Staffan Carlsson, ed., (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 73-86 and 87-99 respectively; the
relevant paragraphs in the Annual Reports by the Secretary General of the OSCE; and the OSCE Handbook
1996, pp. 28-29.  See also the relevant section on long-term missions of the Website f t  OSCE Secretariat.
56 18th CSO, Journal No. 3, Annex 2 (13 December 1992).  See 19 CSO, Journal No. 2, Annex 1 (3 February
1993) for the mission’s Terms of Reference.
57 Törnudd, “Role of the CSCE Missions”, pp. 74-76.
58 According to a US diplomat in a conversation with the author.  The Estonian request was made in
accordance with the first step of the so-called Moscow human dimension mechanism (see Zaagman,
“Institutional Aspects”, p. 237).
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1995 and its implementation, including monitoring citizenship examinations, the processing of
residence permits and the issuing of alien’s passports.  The Mission is also involved in
language training for residents who are not citizens.
The OSCE Mission is also involved in the follow-up of certain aspects of the Russian troop
withdrawal from Estonia.  On 26 July 1994, Estonia and Russia agreed on the withdrawal of
Russian troops and on social guarantees for Russian military pensioners.  According to article
2, paragraph 2, of the “Agreement on Matters Related to Social Guarantees for Military
Pensioners of the Russian Federation on the Territory of the Republic of Estonia”, signed on
26 July 1994, the OSCE was invited to participate in the Estonian Government Commission
on Military Pensioners which is charged to make recommendations on the issuance of
residence permits.  The OSCE Representative was duly appointed and reports to the
Chairman-in-Office.59  He is co-located with the OSCE Mission to Estonia.
In all, the Commission has dealt with about 17,000 applications for residence permits.  As of
mid-July 1998 some 3,000 applications still had to be processed for people with a “security-
related background” whose temporary residence permit would have expired by then.  The
OSCE has sometimes intervened on humanitarian grounds and as a result some refusals were
rescinded.  It has also undertaken activities aimed at integrating or repatriating divorced and
widowed former dependants left behind after the Russian troop withdrawal.
3. The OSCE in Latvia: long-term mission, military pensioners and Skrunda radar station60
The OSCE long-term mission to Latvia was deployed in Riga on 19 November 1993 upon the
recommendation of a Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office.61  It is
mandated to address citizenship issues and other related matters and to be at the disposal of the
Latvian Government and authorities such as the Naturalisation Board for advice on such
issues.  It should also provide information and advice to institutions, organisations and
individuals with an interest in dialogue on these issues, which includes of course persons
belonging to minorities.  Unlike the Terms of Reference for the Mission to Estonia, there are
no provisions on consultation and co-operation with the HCNM in the Mission’s mandate
itself.  However, the report by the Personal Representative stated that the Head of Mission
would ensure the necessary co-ordination and exchange of information on relevant questions
with other OSCE institutions, including ODIHR and the HCNM.62
The Mission followed the process of drafting the new Citizenship Law and made
recommendations to the Government, as did the HCNM.  Elements of these recommendations
                                                                
59 28th CSO, Journal No. 3, Decision (g) (16 September 1994).
60 Based on OSCE Handbook 1996, pp. 30-32, the relevant paragraphs in the Annual Reports by the
OSCE Secretary General and the relevant section of the OSCE Website.
61 It was established by decision of the 23rd CSO meeting on 23 September 1993 (Journal No. 3,
Annex 3).  Its Terms of Reference were adopted at the 31st meeting of the CSO Vienna Group on 7 October
1993 (Annex 1 to the Journal).  The Report of the Personal Representative regarding a Possible CSCE
Presence and Further Engagement in Latvia w s published as CSCE Communication No. 260 of 23
September 1993.
62 Paragraph 12 of the Report of the Personal Representative.
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are reflected in the law which was adopted in a fourth, extraordinary reading by the Parliament
on 22 July 1994, after the President of Latvia had returned the previous version, which had
already been adopted by Parliament, for further consideration. The Mission also followed
events leading up to the adoption of the Law on Non-Citizens which was adopted in April
1995 and its subsequent implementation.  It monitors the naturalisation process as a whole and
makes on-site evaluations of the tests that are part of that process, which includes sitting in on
naturalisation examinations.  The Mission is also involved in activities relating to language
training.
Typical for the activities of the Mission is the systematic collection and processing of
information on individual cases involving citizenship-related problems, which provided a
good basis for the Mission’s work on those issues.  It looks into patterns of rigid or arbitrary
administrative practices and discusses these findings with the Government.  However, it does
not take up individual cases.
A further involvement of the OSCE in Latvia followed from the request by the Latvian and
Russian Governments that the organisation provide assistance in the implementation of two
agreements between them concluded in connection with the withdrawal of the Russian army,
i.e. on the social welfare of retired Russian military personnel and on the legal status of the
Skrunda radar station.  The OSCE agreed to comply with the request and decided on the
modalities for such assistance on 23 February 1995.63
Co-located with and providing full information to the OSCE Mission, the OSCE
Representative to the Russian-Latvian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners and the
Alternate Representative are tasked, inter alia, with considering questions relating to the
application of the provisions of the “Agreement on the Social Welfare of Retired Military
Personnel of the Russian Federation and their Family Members Residing on the Territory of
the Republic of Latvia” of 30 April 1994.  This is done at the request of either party.  Together
with Latvian and Russian representatives, the OSCE Representative will consider appeals on
matters involving the rights of persons to whom the Agreement applies, i.e. Russian military
pensioners and their family members who had permanent residence in Latvia by 28 January
1992, and participate in the adoption of recommendations and decisions on the basis of
consensus.
In June 1995, the parties and the OSCE Representative reached an agreement on the
modalities of work of the Joint Commission.  The OSCE Representative particularly focused
on problems related to pensioners’ rights to housing and work permits, the investigation of
individual cases and the preparation of recommendations for Latvia.
In June 1994, Latvia and Russia requested the OSCE to assist them in monitoring the
implementation of the “Agreement between Latvia and the Russian Federation on the Legal
Status of the Skrunda Radar Station During its Temporary Operation and Dismantling of 30
April 1994” (Article XIV of the Agreement).  An integral part of the agreement on the
                                                                
63 See Permanent Council Journal No. 9 and its Annexes 1 and 2.
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withdrawal of the troops of the Russian Federation (see Article I), the Agreement granted
Russia the right to continue using the Skrunda radar station until 31 August 1998.64  After that
date, Russia would have to dismantle the installation before the Agreement expired on 29
February 2000.  In the meantime, Russia would continue paying rent to Latvia (5 million US
dollars a year).65
The OSCE agreed to the request of Latvia and Russia, and on 23 February 1995 the
Permanent Council decided on the Terms of Reference for an OSCE Inspection Regime.66  On
6 April 1995, an OSCE Representative to the Joint Commission on the Skru da Radar Station
and an Alternate Representative were appointed by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office.  Two
periodic and two extraordinary inspections could be undertaken each year to ascertain that
Moscow was not using the station as a military base.  The first periodic inspection was carried
out from 28 to 30 August 1995 and served as the baseline inspection.  Subsequently, six more
inspections took place.  On 3 September 1998, OSCE experts visited the radar station and
verified that it had indeed been shut down.67  At the request of both parties, who had agreed on
this in the Summer of 1997, the OSCE will remain involved during the dismantling phase
through two inspections per year and participation in the meetings of the Joint Commission.68
4. Conclusion
These OSCE activities illustrate some general points about the potential usefulness of the
OSCE.  First, the OSCE can offer a forum for raising bilateral issues which have wider
(security and stability) implications.  Furthermore, it can act not only as an honest broker
serving the parties to a dispute but also as a politico-diplomatic interposition force between
parties who are, like in the Baltic-Russian case, very unequal in size and power.  The physical
presence of on-site missions symbolises the interest and attention on the part of the OSCE
states as a whole and provides the OSCE with eyes and ears in situ, which is often
indispensable to building a fairly accurate picture of the actual situation.
Despite these obvious advantages for both Baltic states, many Estonian and Latvian politicians
and opinion leaders have come to dislike or even resent the presence of the OSCE Missions
either as unwanted external interference in their countries’ internal affairs or as an expression
of international opinion that something is wrong with the state of democracy and human rights
in Estonia and Latvia.  (Similar sentiments have been expressed in most other OSCE states
which host OSCE missions.)  So far, the US and other Western states, in particular the
member-states of the EU, have been able to convince the Governments of these Baltic states
that it is in their interest to allow the Missions to continue their work.  A name change may be
                                                                
64 Article III.  See also Arie Bloed, “OSCE Monitors Latvian-Russian Agreements”, in Hel inki Monitor
6:2 (1995), 55-56.
65 RFE/RL Newsline of 31 August and 7 September 1998.
66 9th meeting Annex 1.
67 OSCE Newsletter 5:9 (September 1998), 7; Press Release of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
26 August 1998.
68 Paragraph 2.4.3. of the Annual Report 1997 of the Secretary General of the OSCE.
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necessary in the near future—e.g., assistance group instead of mission69—or perhaps even an
amendment to the mandate.  The High Commissioner on National Minorities, too, has to face
such sentiments.70
                                                                
69 Russia would only accept an OSCE mission in Chechnya under the name Assistance Group.  Belarus
admitted a so-called Advisory and Monitoring Group.
70 Extreme opinions can take the form of the advertisements which in 1998 were published by Mr.
Aivars Slucis in the International Herald Tribune in which he called the OSCE and the HCNM “agents of
Russian imperialism” and Van der Stoel “a clone of Chamberlain/von Ribbentrop” (29 April 1998).
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IV.  THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE BALTIC STATES
1. Introduction
The very first situations High Commissioner Van d r Stoel decided to address were those in
the three Baltic states.  He visited Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the last three weeks of
January 1993, returning many more times to the first two countries.  He decided that the inter-
ethnic situation in Lithuania did not warrant the kind of preventive diplomacy he was
mandated to undertake.  The non-Lithuanian component of the population did not exceed
twenty percent, mainly ethnic Poles (9%) and Russians (8%).  Upon restoration of
independence, the Government of Lithuania had offered free choice of citizenship for all
permanent residents, except Soviet military and security personnel and their families.  (The
vast majority of permanent residents seem to have opted for Lithuanian citizenship.)  Another
important factor contributing to the absence of international tension in Lithuania has been the
co-operative and non-confrontational attitude of the Polish Government.
The situations in Estonia and Latvia, however, were typical for the kind of situation for which
the office of the High Commissioner had been created: tensions between a minority on the one
hand and a majority and the state government on the other, and the presence of a neighbouring
kin-state with an interest in the condition of its kinfolk on the other side of the border causing
it to become involved and leading to the international tensions with a potential for
international conflict.  In these particular situations,  the size of the minorities in relation to the
overall population of Estonia and Latvia, the huge disparity in size and power between the
Baltic states and Russia, and the convolutions in the domestic political scene in Moscow were
potentially conflict creating factors.
In Estonia and Latvia, a large part of the population was—and still is—ethnically non-
Estonian (40% in 1993, 35% today) or non-Latvian (almost half then, 44% today).  The great
majority of these peoples were not accepted as Estonian or Latvian citizens when these states
regained their independence in 1991.  Instead of offering citizenship to all residents on the
basis of a “zero-option” formula, like all other states on the territory of the former Soviet
Union did, the Estonian and Latvian Governments restricted automatic citizenship to those
who had held it before the Soviet occupation and their direct descendants.
The non-citizens were for the most part not integrated in Estonian or Latvian society and often
did not speak the national language.  Most ethnic Estonians and Latvians considered them as
illegal immigrants, their presence a product of  the policy of enforced Russification which had
led to considerable demographic changes in their countries which experienced a massive
influx of settlers from other parts of the USSR, mainly Russians and other Slavs. Often
characterised as “Russian-speakers” because of their primary language, these settlers and their
descendants now account e.g., for about 35 percent of the population of Estonia (as opposed to
8 percent in the pre-war period). Many Estonians and Latvians still fear that they will one day
find themselves a minority in their own country, unable to preserve their language and
national identity.
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In addition, the continued presence of Soviet (later: Russian) troops only reinforced those
bitter memories.  Even after the withdrawal of those troops, distrust and resentment remained
important factors in determining the attitude of many ethnic Estonians and Latvians towards
the Russians in their midst, including a fear that they would function as a fifth column to
Moscow.  As a result, in the parliaments of both countries, parties with an ethno-na ionalist
platform have had an influential voice.  The policies of various Estonian and Latvian
Governments towards the non-citizens were to a large extent motivated by the desire to protect
the Estonian and Latvian national identities, respectively.  In particular in Latvia the fear of
“statistical genocide” was quite strong.71
While understandable from a psychological point of view, these policies generated resentment,
distrust and hostility among the non-citizens who feared expulsion from the state (where many
had been born) or deprivation of political and economic rights if they were allowed to remain.
(Certainly in the first few years, there were strong voices advocating such drastic measures.)
In addition, many had great difficulty in adjusting to a new situation in which they were no
longer the representatives of the dominant nation in the state and in which their language had
been replaced as the official tongue by a language few of them spoke or even understood.
This sentiment is still quite widespread.  Lastly, those non-citizens who in 1991 had come out
in favour of Estonian or Latvian independence felt a sense of betrayal.
The Russian Federation did little to take away the fear on the part of the Balts that its ultimate
goal was reintegration of the Baltic states into a reborn Soviet Union.  It used every
opportunity to put pressure on Estonia and Latvia, shifting its focus from one to the other as
circumstances changed.  Immediately after Baltic independence, it linked the withdrawal of its
troops and, at a later stage, the resolution of the border question with Estonia to the issue of the
treatment of not only ethnic Russians but of all Russian-speakers.72  Other steps were also
taken: An energy embargo in 1993 imposed on all three Baltic states found a distant echo in
various economic sanctions—called “measures” by the Russian Government—against Latvia
in the Spring and Summer of 1998, such as actions and regulations by the Russian Central
Bank and new tariffs for railroad transports.
The danger of an escalation of the tensions into an international conflict was most pressing
in the first few years.  Without the intervention of the OSCE and the High Commissioner, a
long-term process of alienation and growing distrust could have provided a fertile breeding
ground for tensions which under the circumstances could have led to a violent conflict.  The
OSCE High Commissioner prevented during those first few years the enactment of
legislation and policies which would have created a strong basis for long-term resentment
                                                                
71 For an analysis see Graham Smith’s articles “The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship
Question in Estonia and Latvia”, Nationalities Papers 24:2 (1996), 199-216, and “When Nations Challenge
and Nations Rule: Estonia and Latvia as Ethnic Democracies”, International Politics 33:1 (1996), 25-41.
72 See also Estonia and Latvia: Citizenship, Language and Conflict Prevention. A Special Report by the
Forced Migration Project (New York: Open Society Institute, August 1997), pp. 8-12. Representative of the
official Russian position is Te muraz Ramishvili, “Latvia and Estonia: Human Rights Violations in the Center of
Europe”, in I ternational Affairs [Moscow] 44:4 (1998), 116-127.  (Ramishvili is the head of the directorate for
international humanitarian cooperation and human rights of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)
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into which nationalist and expansionist circles in Moscow, if not a future Russian
government, could have played.  The crisis in Estonia over the Law on Aliens in the
Summer of 1993 demonstrated what kinds of dangerous situations could have arisen.
2.  HCNM conflict prevention in practice: crisis in Estonia73
At the end of June and the beginning of July 1993, tensions in Estonia increased.  The
adoption by the Estonian parliament of a law on the status of aliens led to fears among the
non-citizen population of Estonia that a process of expulsion had been set into motion.  Partly
in response to that law, calls for a referendum on local autonomy in the mostly Russian-
inhabited Estonian cities of Narva and Sillamäe gained strength.  The Russian Foreign
Ministry announced measures in protest of the law which it characterised as a grave violation
of human rights, and an escalating stream of accusations ensued from Moscow.
Coincidentally, natural gas deliveries from Russia were cut off to all Baltic states but in the
case of Estonia implicitly linked to Estonia’s domestic policies.  Deeply concerned about the
rapid escalation of events but not wishing to give in to the Russians’ demands, even
threatening armed measures, the Estonian Government confidentially asked the OSCE
Chairman-in-Office, Sweden, for urgent assistance.
As a result of consultations with the HCNM, on 25 June President Lennart Meri of Estonia
issued a communiqué in which he announced that he had requested an expert opinion from
the OSCE on the law on the status of aliens and furthermore that he had decided to
establish a roundtable on minority issues.  On 30 June 1993, the OSCE states invited the
High Commissioner “to respond promptly, on behalf of the OSCE,” to President Meri’s
request.  They also voiced their support for the HCNM’s continued involvement in Estonia
and invited the Government of Estonia “to take appropriate action in response to the
recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.”74  The political
support thus given to the HCNM was reinforced by a letter from the OSCE Chairman-in-
Office, Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha f Ugglas, to President Meri in which she
expressed her full support for the High Commissioner's advice on the law.75
After a period of intense “shuttle diplomacy”, including further consultations with President
Meri, on 12 July the HCNM was able to secure a compromise which was reflected in a
statement he issued on assurances received from the Estonian Government and from
representatives of the Russian community in Estonia.  He was able to convince the leaders
of the predominantly Russian-populated towns of Narva and Sillamäe to respect the
                                                                
73  See Konrad J. Huber, Averting Inter-Ethnic-Conflict: An Analysis of the CSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities in Estonia, January-July 1993  (Atlanta: Carter Center of Emory University, April
1994).  Also of interest in this regard is Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet
Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-east Estonia”, Europe-Asia
Studies 49:5 (1997), 845-864.
74 22nd CSO, Journal No. 2, Annex 2.
75 CSCE Communication No. 194 of 8 July 1993.  Although the Swedish Chairman-in-Office was in
close and continual contact with the HCNM, it is remarkable that the OSCE states gave the High
Commissioner more or less carte blanche in this crisis.
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territorial integrity of Estonia and to abide by a forthcoming ruling by the National Court
on the legality of the referenda.  (As generally expected, they were ruled illegal and did not
take place.)  Following the HCNM's recommendations and comments by Council of Europe
experts, the President issued a communiqué in which he announced his decision to send the
Law on Aliens back to Parliament.76  Subsequently, the law was amended by Parliament,
taking on board the HCNM’s recommendations.77
                                                                
76 The HCNM statement and presidential communiqué are reproduced in Annex 3.
77 The High Commissioner's comments and recommendations were made public by President Meri
(text in Helsinki Monitor 4:3 (1993), 89-91).
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V.  THE HIGH COMMISSIONER IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA 78
1. Introduction
From the perspective of the High Commissioner, the situations in Estonia and Latvia had
many similarities and in both cases he addressed the same problems and came up with
largely similar recommendations.  The present chapter will not treat both situations
separately but as far as practicable together, referring mainly to the Estonian case.  In
addition, a few issues which are particular to Latvia will also be discussed.
In the following, the recommendations are not treated in a strictly chronological order but
rather thematically, with a focus on the most important sources of friction and tension as
the HCNM sees them.
2.  General HCNM analysis of the situation
In his first letter to the Government of Estonia,79 the High Commissioner expressed his
awareness of “the political and psychological background of many of the questions” he would
be dealing with: the long years Estonia suffered under Soviet occupation, the bitterness caused
by the deliberate policy of Russification during those years, Estonian concerns about the
continued presence of Russian troops on Estonian territory, and the determination of the
Estonian people to maintain its national identity.
As a gesture to the Estonian Government, Van der Stoel also stated that he had registered the
concern it had expressed about the situation of the Estonians living on the territory of the
Russian Federation.  In other cases the HCNM has taken note of similar concerns and has
addressed them if he thought they would fall within his competence.  However, he never
considered this as a quid pro quo nor did he accept any kind of interdependence between
situations.  (Nevertheless, the Estonian Government from time to time found it useful to point
at other situations in which it felt the HCNM should become involved, e.g., Chechnya.)80
Then the HCNM established several important basic facts, i.e. that:
· “there is no convincing evidence of systematic persecution of the non-Estonian population
since the reestablishment of Estonian independence, and moreover, that there have
virtually been no incidents pointing to interethnic violence”;
· the Estonian Government had repeatedly assured him that “it was determined to fully
respect its CSCE commitments, including those concerning minorities” and that its aim
was “to find a formula for the problem of the non-Estonian population in [Estonia] in
                                                                
78 Based on the written recommendations that were made public by the OSCE.
79 Letter of 6 April 1993 to Foreign Minister Tr vimi Velliste.  The first letter to the Latvian Foreign
Minister was remarkably similar in tone and, even though it was longer, contents.  As an illustration of the
present HCNM’s method of work, it is included as Annex 2.
80 E.g. Acting Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijärv in his letter of 27 November 1996.
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accordance with the international standards subscribed to by Estonia.”  He then wrote that
his recommendations were intended to help the Government achieving that aim; and,
finally and most importantly,
· the non-Estonian population was there to stay and the Estonian Government and
population would have to come to terms with that fact.
The first statement was a message to three different parties:
· the Estonian Government was reassured that the HCNM would not be an “Estonia-basher”
or be focusing exclusively on protecting the human rights of persons belonging to
minorities.  This has to be seen against the background of the considerable number of
visits by international human rights missions to the Baltic states, which had led to a sort of
“human rights mission fatigue” on the part of their Governments, and the stream of
criticism emanating from Moscow regarding the treatment of the “Russian-speaking”
population in the Baltic states;
· the OSCE states were told that there was no reason to treat Estonia as a state with serious
human rights problems; as the HCNM would make clear later on, the challenges lay
elsewhere; and
· Russia received the signal that its assessment of the situation as one of massive human
rights abuses was not shared by the HCNM.  (Russia reacted rather low-key to this
message and supported the recommendations made by Van der Stoel.)81  At later
occasions, HCNM Van der Stoel would reiterate this point or refer to the overall inter-
ethnic situation in positive terms.82
The second statement reinforced this message, but it also tied Estonia to the commitment to
implement its international obligations, including OSCE commitments.  This was apparently
meant to rule out the—albeit unlikely—possibility of an eventual later rejection by Estonia of
the latter on the grounds that OSCE commitments are not legally binding.  (A variation on this
theme are the references the HCNM repeatedly makes to earlier promises or policy statements
by Estonian cabinets, also useful in view of the frequent changes in government in Estonia.)83
Thirdly, the HCNM had concluded that the great majority of non-Estonians would probably
prefer to stay in Estonia because they had been living there for a long time or had been born
                                                                
81 CSCE Communication No. 125  / Add. 1 of 26 April 1993.
82 E.g.  in his letter of 21 May 1997 to Estonian Foreign Minister Tooma  H ndrik Ilves: “Regarding the
opinion of non-citizens on their present position in Estonia I have noted the findings of the survey conducted
in the autumn of 1996 by the International Orga isation for Migration (IOM) and UNDP [the United Nations
Development Programme], which show that 6.5% of the non-citizens of Estonia consider their relations with
Estonians as very good, 37.4% as good, and 50% as satisfactory.  Only 6.2% of this group describe their
relations as bad or very bad.  These figures demonstrate convincingly that inter-ethnic relations in Estonia are,
on the whole, good.”
83 For the political fragility of Estonian and Latvian coalition governments see Estonia and Latvia:
Citizenship, Language and Conflict Prevention, pp. 13-14.
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there and because they would see no prospect of finding homes and jobs in the Russian
Federation or another CIS state.84  For him, the fact that only a limited number of the non-
Estonians residing in Estonia who were eligible to apply for Estonian citizenship had done so
was not a sufficiently reliable indication of a lack of interest in acquiring Estonian citizenship.
Non-Estonians had either insufficient knowledge of the opportunities which the Estonian
legislation offered them or they feared that the language requirements might be too difficult.
The proposition that the non-Estonians were there to stay—for many Estonians hard to come
to terms with—in the view of the High Commissioner necessarily led to the conclusion that
the Estonian Government would have to work towards the integration of large numbers of
non-Estonian non-citizens and giving them a fair deal.  In the words of the HCNM, to try to
assure a privileged position for the Estonian population vis-à-vis the non-Estonian population
would be incompatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of various international obligations
Estonia had accepted.  It would also involve a considerable risk of increasing tensions with the
non-Estonian population.  This in turn could lead to a destabilisation of the country as a whole
and would have a strongly negative effect on relations between Estonia and the Russian
Federation.
Furthermore, the HCNM pointed to the additional, complicating factor that most of the non-
Estonians had been living in Estonia for many years and had their roots there, preferring to
continue to live there.  Indeed, many of them had voted for its independence in the referendum
of 1991.  Formerly citizens of the Soviet Union living in Estonia, they were now considered
aliens.  This inevitably caused—sometimes strong—emotions and concerns.85
The HCNM concluded that the Government should aim for the integration of the non-Estonian
population by a deliberate policy of facilitating the chances of acquiring Estonian citizenship
for those who would express such a wish, and of assuring them full equality with Estonian
citizens.  He then employed a straightforward conflict-prevention argument: Such a policy
would greatly reduce the danger of destabilisation because it would considerably enhance the
chances of the non-Estonian population of developing a sense of loyalty toward Estonia.  This
policy would not mean the end of the ethnic Estonians or lead to a clash of interests (which is
another point the HCNM often makes), but would be compatible with the wish of the
Estonians to ensure and strengthen their political, cultural and linguistic identity.
On a final note, the High Commissioner advocated that humanitarian considerations and
reasonableness should be the guiding principles regarding those persons who did not qualify
for citizenship nor had the status of permanent residents.86
At the same time, from the beginning the HCNM made it clear that a policy of integration
could only succeed if the non-Estonian population would also make a determined effort at
                                                                
84 A point also borne out by various sociological surveys.  See for example Estonia’s Experiment – The
Possibilities to Integrate Non-Citizens Into Estonian Society, Tallinn 1997 (Tallinn: Open Estonia
Foundation, 1997).
85 Letter of 1 July 1993 to Estonian President Meri.
86 Letter of 6 April 1993 to Estonian Foreign Minister Vell .
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integration.  In his view, the adaptation to the reality of the re-emergence of Estonia as an
independent state required that at any rate those who had not yet retired from work and did not
yet speak the Estonian language would make a determined effort to learn that language to such
a degree that they would be able to conduct a simple conversation in Estonian.  In this way
they would, without having to sacrifice their cultural or linguistic identity, provide a
convincing proof of their willingness to integrate.  (While Van der Stoel was right in pointing
this out, it should be recalled that, strictly speaking, as High Commissioner he can only
address governments, not individuals or groups such as minorities.)
In this context, he again made a reference to the issue of troop withdrawal: “The required
psychological adaptation [by the non-Estonians] to the reality of the re-emergence of Estonia
as an independent state would also be enhanced if it would be possible to ensure rapid
implementation of paragraph 15 of the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration, calling for ‘the
conclusion, without delay, of agreements, including timetables, for the early, orderly and
complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic states.’”87
3.  Recommendations
The recommendations by the High Commissioner to the Estonian and Latvian Governments
fall into two general categories, those on overall government policy towards the non-Estonians
and non-Latvians and those regarding specific pieces of legislation or initiatives.  The section
on general policy focuses on the issues of information and transparency, legal certainty and the
establishment of channels of communication.  With regard to the latter, I have concentrated on
the main issues relating to the position of non-Estonians and non-Latvians in Estonia and
Latvia, respectively: citizenship, naturalisation, stateless children and aliens’ legislation.
While issues such as cultural and linguistic rights and education are also of importance and
would certainly have been dealt with in a more extensive treatise of the Baltic situations, the
problem areas selected would for the time being seem to be key to a resolution of the tensions
in Estonia and Latvia.  The High Commissioner, as well, has given first priority to them.
a.  General policy
From the very beginning, a constant element has been the HCNM’s emphasis on the need for
information, transparency and visibility.  In his view, non-citizens’ concerns and
misunderstandings about the intentions of the Government could be taken away or at least
mitigated if they would know what their rights are, what the procedures are, what the
Government intends to do regarding new legislation, regulations and practical questions
concerning citizenship, language requirements, the status of aliens, etc.88  In his lett r of 1 July
1993 to President Lennart Meri, the HCNM recommended that the Government announce
publicly concrete steps to implement a number of the recommendations he made in April to
convince especially the Russian residents of Estonia that the Government of Estonia wants to
                                                                
87 Idem.
88 In his letter of 6 April 1993 the HCNM recommends that the Government ensure maximum publicity
for the Law on Estonian Language Requirements for Applicants for Citizenship and for the government
regulations to implement it, especially amongst the Russian population.
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co-operate and does not intend to begin a process of expelling a large number of them.  The
Government should continue its efforts at informing the non-Estonian population about the
legislation (aliens’ legislation is mentioned several times), regulations and practical questions
concerning citizenship, language requirements, etc.89  Apart from the psychological effects—
understanding that government actions were aimed at integrating the non-Estonian population
and were not the beginning of a process of expulsion—the High Commissioner argued that
such publicity measures would also stimulate non-citizens to apply for citizenship or to
register.
Initially, the results were mixed.  On the one hand, the Estonian Government stated that it fully
supported the recommendation of the High Commissioner “to take early action to improve a
visible policy of dialogue between the Government of Estonia and the non-citizen population”,
including “providing better and more comprehensive information to the non-Estonian
population on their rights and obligations, pertinent legislation and regulations as well as on
practical matters concerning citizenship application, language instruction and examinations
and other issues affecting their integration into Estonian society.”90
Four years later, however, the need to provide non-citizens with timely information regarding
matters of direct interest for them was apparently still of great concern to the HCNM, i.e. that
not enough had been done.91  The Government apparently also recognised this and made it one
of the main tasks of the Minister for Inter-Ethnic affairs whose function was established in
1997.  The HCNM made his own contributions to spreading relevant information by
commissioning the publication of two brochures on the naturalisation process, in both the
Estonian and Russian languages.  The first brochure contains the list of questions which can be
put during the test on the Constitution.  The second provides, inter alia, information on
procedures of application for citizenship and information on language courses.92
In the correspondence between the HCNM and the Government of Latvia, too, this issue kept
cropping up.93  Van der Stoel recommended the production and wide distribution of a simple
brochure providing information on citizenship legislation and regulations plus the posting at
public places and streets of posters and placards carrying the most important passages or a
summary of the main points of the brochure.  In the end, the HCNM commissioned the
production of an information brochure for distribution among non-citizens.94
In this context, the HCNM repeatedly stressed the need to avoid or clarify misunderstandings.
For example, with regard to Article 22 of the draft Latvian law on citizenship (25 November
1993), he noted that the notion of “state and nation of Latvia” in the proposed oath would
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91 Letter of  21 May 1997 to Minister Ilves.
92 Funded by the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, which supports the work of the HCNM and is
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cause “confusion”, meaning that non-Latvians would read it as excluding them.  To avoid
misinterpretations, he suggested to use the notion “state and people of Latvia”.95
In several instances, the High Commissioner has urged the governments in question to ensure
that legislation would be uniformly interpreted and implemented, e.g., with regard to the Law
on Estonian Language Requirements for Applicants for Citizenship (in particular Article 3,
paragraph 1)96 or the Law on Aliens (Article 21 of which gives a key role to the local
government in implementing the law).97  Apart from underlining the normal legal requirement
that similar cases in similar circumstances be treated similarly—a principle of legal security—
these exhortations would also seem to have another objective: to point out to the Government
that it is responsible for the actions of lower authorities and that the adoption of legislation is
only part of the implementation of measures.  (While central governments may be willing to
do their best, local officials may not.  Most people will deal—will have no choice in dealing—
with lower-level officials.  Perceptions of progress or the lack thereof will often be determined
by local official behaviour.)
Partly against the background of his wish for greater transparency, partly because he is
generally in favour of structured government-to-minority dialogue, the High Commissioner
has been an ardent supporter of the decision of Estonian President Meri to create a roundtable
of non-citizens and ethnic minorities. The establishment of the Roundtable had been
announced by the President in his communiqué of 25 June 1993: “In order to secure domestic
peace and a balanced policy essential for the reconstruction of the Republic of Estonia, the
President of the Republic has decided to initiate a Round Table of non-citizens and ethnic
minorities. The Round Table will present the conclusions of their discussions to the President
in written form. Depending on the nature of each problem, the President of the Republic will
forward them for examination to the Council of Europe, the CSCE, the Riigikoguor for
settlement by the pertinent state bodies.”
The mandate of the Roundtable is to work out recommendations and proposals concerning,
inter alia, “the integration into Estonian society of all people who have linked their lives to
Estonia or wish to do so”, “the resolution of the social-economic, cultural and legal problems
of aliens and stateless persons permanently residing in Estonia as well as of ethnic minorities”,
“support for persons seeking Estonian citizenship”, and “the resolution of questions related to
the learning and use of the Estonian language.”  The members of the Roundtable are appointed
by the President, “taking into account the need to have as many different national minority
associations and political parties represented as possible.”  (There are, however, indications
that some minorities are not very satisfied with its results.)98
In the view of the HCNM, the Roundtable should also develop into a channel for bringing
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97 Letter of 1 July 1993 to President Meri.
98 The current S atutes of the Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities, which w re adopted on 11
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specific concerns and problems facing non-citizens and ethnic minorities to the attention of the
authorities. He recommended to use the first meeting of the Roundtable to emphasise that non-
Estonians who have legally resided in Estonia for more than two years and who want to
acquire Estonian citizenship would be free to do so.  Furthermore, the Roundtable could be
used to assuage fears that the language requirement for citizenship would be too high by
making it clear that the ability to conduct a simple conversation in Estonian would be
sufficient.  The High Commissioner at the time offered his help to develop the Roundtable
(which was accepted),99 continued to follow its activities and development100 and was from
time to time invited to participate in its meetings.
Similarly, Van der Stoel welcomed the initiative of Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis to
establish a Consultative Council on Nationalities which according to him could be an
important forum to discuss the moral and human aspects of the integration process.  He
supported its mandate “to gain comprehensive information concerning various ethnic groups
in Latvia, and to discuss their most essential problems so as to promote their solution at the
level of legislative or executive powers”.  He also thought it should discuss ways to remove
the causes of the stagnation in the naturalisation process.101  On 16 May 1996, Van derStoel
participated in a seminar in Riga aimed at promoting government-minority dialogue, inte  alia
by promoting the establishment of such a presidential roundtable.102
Inspired by the Scandinavian examples, the High Commissioner proposed to both the Estonian
and the Latvian (and Lithuanian) Governments the establishment of the office of an
independent “National Commissioner on Ethnic and Language Questions”.103  The main task
of this Commissioner would be to take up with government agencies complaints, answer
questions, help clarify grey areas in legislation and practice such as possible diverging
interpretations of the same laws by different authorities, and in general to act as a go-between
to the Government and the community concerned. He or she would also have to actively find
out about uncertainties and dissatisfaction involving minorities. In this way, he or she could
help to prevent tensions from arising or to reduce or eliminate them.  He or she should focus
his/her activities primarily on the North-eastern region of Estonia, specifically including the
Estonian minority there.  Finally, the National Commissioner should have the general
confidence of all parties concerned.  If it should prove impossible to find one person meeting
this criterion, then a commission of three could be established to perform the same tasks, e.g.,
one Commissioner with two deputies, a triumvirate based on the structure of many
ombudsman offices.  The HCNM offered his assistance in developing this idea.104
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In its reaction of April 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia commented that the
Estonian Constitution already included the post of ombudsman. (Strictly speaking, this was
incorrect.  The Constition only provides for the office of the Legal Chancellor who shall
analyse national and local legislation to check its “conformity with the Constitution and the
laws” and proposals concerning the activities of state agencies.)105 Nevertheless, it thought
that the recommendation merited examination to determine how such an office could most
beneficially be established in Estonia.  However, matters did not progress much and were
eventually subsumed under the general heading of an ombudsman dealing with all human
rights-related complaints.  In May 1997, the HCNM responded that “If the Ombudsman would
be able to deal with the complaints of all residents of Estonia, and not exclusively its citizens,
he could in effect fulfil the role of the National Commissioner on Ethnic and Language
Questions (…).”106 Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves eacted affirmatively.107
(So far, this office has not been established.  Apparently, the Estonian Government has
decided to expand the mandate of the Legal Chancellor to include ombudsman-type activities,
probably including cases involving non-citizens.  However, this office is not independent but
is filled by a government official.)
b.  Citizenship
Estonia and Latvia were annexed by the USSR in 1940 and regained their independence only
in 1991.  As a result of the massive Ru sification during the Soviet period, “Russian-speakers”
and their descendants now account for about 35 percent of the population of Estonia and for
44 percent in Latvia (as opposed to about 8-10 percent in the pre-war period).  Fearful of
losing their identity, after the resumption of independence in 1991 the Estonian and Latvian
Governments decided not to give automatic citizenship to those people who had settled in the
country during the Soviet period.
Instead, the Estonian parliament, or Riigik gu, on 26 February 1992 re-adopted Estonia's pre-
war Law on Citizenship (adopted in 1938 and amended in 1940).  As a result, only those
people who had lived in Estonia prior to 1940 or their descendants received Estonian
citizenship automatically, while some 400,000 Soviet-era settlers and their offspring found
themselves without citizenship.
The Law on Citizenship also laid down conditions for naturalisation, stating that aliens
wishing to obtain Estonian citizenship must live in Estonia on the basis of a permanent
residence permit for no less than two years before and one year after applying for citizenship;
they were also required to demonstrate a knowledge of the Estonian language.  A
parliamentary decision of 26 February 1992 determined that the time period for permanent
residence was to be calculated from 30 March 1990.  A non-citizen who had taken up
residence in Estonia on or before that date and had lived there continuously ever since became
                                                                
105 Chapter XII of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia.  The English translation of the
Constitution can be found at: http://www.rk.ee/rkogu/eng/epseng.html.
106 Letter of 21 May 1997 to Minister Ilves.
107 Reply of 4 June 1997.
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eligible to apply for Estonian citizenship, therefore, as of 30 March 1992.  The Law on
Language Requirements for Applicants for Citizenship, adopted in 1993, required applicants
for citizenship to pass a test in the Estonian language.
The implementation law allowed the Government to waive requirements for applicants who
were ethnic Estonians or who had performed valuable service to Estonia but prohibited the
naturalisation of (1) foreign military personnel on active service; (2) persons who had been in
the employ of the security and intelligence services of the USSR; (3) persons who had been
convicted of serious criminal offences against the person or who had a record of repeated
convictions for felonies; and (4) persons without a legal steady income.  Those whose
applications for naturalisation were rejected did not have the right of appeal.
The Law on Language Requirements for Applicants for Citizenship, adopted in 1993, required
applicants for citizenship to pass a test in the Estonian language. This created problems for
some non-citizens, particularly in places where Russians made up the majority of the
population.
In Latvia, a similar development took place.  A Supreme Council Resolution was passed on 15
October 1991 declaring that only citizens of the i terwar republic (1918-1940) and their direct
descendants could automatically become Latvian citizens.  The rest (who amounted to almost
30% of the population) would have to wait for the adoption of legislation on naturalisation.
The October Resolution also listed the conditions for naturalisation—16 years of residence,
knowledge of the Latvian language and swearing an oath of loyalty to the Republic of
Latvia—and impediments to acquiring citizenship, i.e. service in the Soviet military or secret
police and membership of the Soviet Communist Party.
In the analysis of the High Commissioner, the fact that in both countries the majority, if not
the vast majority, of non-citizens wanted to stay inevitably led to the conclusion that these
people would have to be integrated, meaning that they would have to feel secure in Estonia or
Latvia and develop ties of trust and loyalty to these states.  Concerns that non-citizens had
about their present and future status would have to be dispelled.  Naturalisation, the acquisition
of Estonian or Latvian citizenship, was—and still is—in his view the one major factor
facilitating such a process.
Otherwise, non-citizens might apply for Russian citizenship, to which virtually no
requirements are attached except former Soviet citizenship, which would increase the already
large group of people with civic loyalties to the Russian Federation (at present about 130,000
or almost ten percent of the overall population of Estonia, far less in Latvia).  Moreover, since
under international law a state has certain rights regarding the protection of its citizens abroad,
the presence of hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens in Estonia or Latvia would lead to
strongly increased Russian attempts at interference in the internal affairs of these states.
(Strangely, the Estonian Government did not seem too worried about this: “That individuals
living in Estonia continue to apply for Russian citizenship should not be a cause for concern.
As you yourself have emphasised, the main goal should be to decrease the number of stateless
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individuals.  The granting of Estonian citizenship depends in large part on the willingness of
the applicant him- or herself to complete the naturalisation requirements, a factor which is
difficult for the Government to influence.  The decision by some individuals to take Russian
citizenship until such time as they are ready to decide to apply for Estonian citizenship, and
take the requisite tests, should not be viewed as a negative development.”)108
In the case of Latvia, High Commissioner Van d Stoel warned that the reputation of Latvia
as a democratic state was at stake: “(…) within the community of CSCE states, the solution of
the citizenship issues is seen as being closely connected with democratic principles.  If the
overwhelming majority of non-Latvians in your country is denied the right to become citizens,
and consequently the right to be involved in key decisions concerning their own interests, the
character of the democratic system in Latvia might even be put into question.  In this
connection I refer to the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document which states that the basis of the
authority and legitimacy of all governments is the will of the people.”109
As a consequence of Van der Stoel’s insistence on the centrality of naturalisation to the
solution of the ethnic issues in Estonia and Latvia, many of his recommendations are aimed at
facilitating and promoting the acquisition of Estonian or Latvian citizenship by the stateless in
those countries.  In his view, requirements should not be unreasonably difficult and the
Government would have to provide for the possibility to take language training.  Apparently,
many non-Estonians and non-Latvians were unaware of the possibilities for applying, doubted
that they would be able to pass the required tests, or simply preferred sitting on the fence and
to wait and see what would happen.  A major challenge therefore is to convince the non-
citizens that it is worthwhile investing time, energy and money in the naturalisation process.
After all, they would have to make the choice to apply for citizenship and to prepare for the
naturalisation process, including the language and constitutional knowledge tests.
Furthermore, for those who had not, or not yet, acquired citizenship, the HCNM argued that
their status as residents and aliens would have to be defined and protected in such a way that
fears of expulsion and economic discrimination would be groundless.
Addressing these major issues entails tackling a great number of sub-issues: questions
concerning statelessness, in particular of children; the high level of language and knowledge
requirements, examination fees (too high for many), the possibility of repeat examinations
(originally not foreseen), the requirement of a lawful income (unemployment benefits now
count as such), non-discrimination and the period of required residence; aliens’ passports,
(temporary and permanent) residence and employment permits for aliens; proper appeals
procedures and the role of courts, concerns about safeguarding a uniform interpretation of the
law; and the position of army and security services personnel and their families.  Each of these
sub-issues has been the subject of a number of HCNM recommendations.
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In the following I will concentrate on the central issues only, many of which have been the
subject of long and sometimes difficult consultations between the High Commissioner and the
Governments of Estonia and Latvia.
c. Naturalisation
From the very beginning of his involvement in Estonia and Latvia, the High Commissioner
has recommended that the language requirements should not exceed the ability to conduct a
simple conversation in the national language (a knowledge of about 1500 words) and that the
requirements would practically be waived for persons born before 1 January 1930 and for
disabled persons.  In 1997,110 the HCNM concluded with regard to Estonia that after the
various changes made to it the language test could not reasonably be considered too high.
Nevertheless, it was still a formidable barrier.  When the written test was abolished for
applicants born before 1 January 1930, the HCNM recommended that for them the oral test
also be abolished.111
Both with a view to the language test as part of the application procedure for citizenship and
for the integration in society as a whole, the HCNM deemed essential the promotion of the
knowledge of the national language.112  He has continually encouraged both Governments to
enhance their efforts aimed at the acquisition by non-indigenous residents of a reasonable level
of knowledge of the language.  He therefore welcomed the decision of the Estonian
Government to make an effort to increase the number of qualified teachers in the Estonian
language, especially in those areas of Estonia where Russian speakers constitute the majority
of the population (i.e. the North-east).  The problem of resource constraints was discussed with
other governments, in particular in Scandinavia and with the European Commission, and a
number of governments have assisted Estonia (and Latvia) in these efforts.113
According to the new Estonian Law on Citizenship which came into force on 1 April 1995,
applicants for citizenship would also have to pass an examin tion on the Constitution of
Estonia.  The HCNM agreed that persons who want to enjoy the benefits of citizenship should
also show their willingness to integrate by acquiring a certain knowledge of the official
language of the State and of the principles of the State structure.  However, he thought that
many questions were too difficult, e.g., who decides the question of handing over a citizen of
Estonia to a foreign state, who has responsibility for securing (people's) rights and freedoms,
and naming three basic obligations of each citizen established in the Constitution of the
Estonian Republic.  Moreover, applicants would have to use the Estonian language in
answering the questions.  The HCNM therefore suggested making the examination concerning
the Constitution considerably easier.  Although the Government of Estonia has indeed made a
number of changes to the examination, discussions are still ongoing.
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The required period of residence before one could apply for citizenship also raised concerns.
In December 1994,114 the HCNM advocated that the draft Law on Citizenship which was then
under consideration in the Riigikogu make it very clear that the criteria of five (plus one) years
of permanent residence—counted from 30 March 1990—would be based on the time of actual
residence in Estonia,115 and that the period spent in Estonia would be calculated both on the
basis of permanent registration in the former Estonian SSR and on the basis of residence
permits, permanent or temporary, under the new Law on Aliens.  (Non-citizens who had been
residing in Estonia since at least 30 March 1990 would fulfil the residence requirement on 30
March 1995.)
Of particular concern to Van der Stoel in the case of Latvia were the steps taken to limit the
number of possible applicants for naturalisation in order to prevent a situation in which too
many non-Latvians would be naturalised at the same time: the quota and windows systems.
Apparently, the Latvian Government feared that its administration would be overwhelmed by
the number of applications and that society would be swamped by people who were not
sufficiently able to integrate.
Article 9 of the draft Law on Citizenship of 25 November 1993 established annual
naturalisation quotas, the size of which would be decided upon by the Government and
approved by the Latvian parliament, or Saeima, “taking into consideration the demographic
and economic situation in the country, in order to ensure the development of Latvia as a
single-nation state.”  Van der Stoel feared that the phrase “single-nation state” would lead to
concerns about the rights of non-Latvians.  Furthermore, the Government and Parliament
would have such latitude in determining the size of the annual quotas that they could decide
not to allow any naturalisation or very small quotas for a considerable number of years.  This
would lead to considerable and long-term uncertainty, even among persons who had been
living in Latvia for a long time or were born there.  (Van d rStoel implied that this legal
uncertainty was incompatible with a society based on the rule of law in which the people
know about their rights and the rights are established and granted in clear terms by the law.)
Instead, HCNM Van der Stoel recommended replacing the quota system by a system which
would give precedence to four categories such as persons married to a Latvian citizen and
persons born in Latvia.  Thereafter, naturalisation would start in 1996 for persons having
resided in Latvia for 20 years, in 1997 for those with 15 years of residence, and in 1998 for all
those with 10 years of residence.  (In addition to the residence requirement, applicants would
have to demonstrate a basic knowledge of the Latvian language and swear an oath of loyalty
to the Republic of Latvia.)  In this way, a gradual system of naturalisation would be
maintained but non-Latvian residents would have certainty about their chances of acquiring
citizenship.116
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Indeed, the final text of the Law on Citizenship did not include a system of annual quotas.
Then, however, the so-called “window system” was introduced which did not allow all those
interested in citizenship to apply at the same time but gave priority to those born in Latvia over
those born outside Latvia and priority to the younger age groups in each of a number of
special categories over the older ones.  Thus, the right to apply for naturalisation was spread
over 7 years, beginning in 1996 (instead of the three years proposed by the HCNM).  Van der
Stoel noted that only very few applicants had made use of the “window” which was open in
1996.  He concluded that the problem confronting Latvia was not the danger of being
swamped by a great number of applicants at the same time, but the risk that the process of
naturalisation was moving much too slowly.  He therefore recommended the abolishment of
the “window system”.117
After a lengthy discussion with the Government, a difficult struggle developed within the
Saeima which eventually adopted the necessary amendments to the Latvian Law on
Citizenship (on 22 June 1998).  However, political parties opposed to the amendments (which
also involved granting citizenship to all stateless children born in Latvia; see below) managed
to force a national referendum (which coincided with the political atmosphere of a national
election being held on the same date).  On 3 October 1998 the referendum was decided in
favour of the retention of the amendments and as a consequence the “window system” was
abolished. (It is interesting to note how closely this process was followed by the EU, which
issued congratulatory statements on 25 June and 5 October 1998, praising Latvia for its
“farsighted” and “courageous” decisions.  In its 5 October statement, the EU concluded that
the outcome of the referendum was “consistent with the principles and aims of the European
Union”—which in view of Latvia’s aspirations to become an EU member can also be
construed as a warning not to deviate from the right path.)
d.  Stateless children
From the beginning, the High Commissioner has recommended specifically that children born
in Estonia who would otherwise become stateless should be granted Estonian citizenship.118
Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to respond positively, apparently little
concrete action was taken on this issue.  (In Latvia, the same problem existed, addressed by
the High Commissioner in almost exactly the same terms.)
With a view to stimulating a then stagnant process (and hopefully spurring the overall
integration process), HCNM Van der Stoel wrote extensively on 21 May 1997 to Estonian
Foreign Minister Ilves on the issue.  He presented first an elaborate legal argument why
Estonia is obliged to grant citizenship to children born on its territory who would otherwise be
stateless.  He then argued that there were equally strong political arguments for doing so.  The
vast majority of the younger generation were eager to integrate and learn the Estonian
language, supported in this by their parents.  The risk would be very small that the group of
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children who should automatically receive Estonian citizenship would have inadequate
knowledge of the Estonian language.  Concluding, the HCNM stressed that he did not argue
for an automatic granting of citizenship to this category of children.  Parents would have to
apply and they would have to have had lawful and habitual residence for a period of five years
immediately preceding the lodging of such an application.
At first, the Estonian Government rejected the reasoning of the High Commissioner, arguing
that commitment would have to be shown by taking the language and constitutional tests.119
However, later it changed its course and amendments to the citizenship law concerning
stateless children were submitted to Parliament in December 1997.  Minors born after 26
February 1992 would be given citizenship if they otherwise would have no citizenship at all.
In the Riigikogu, however, matters did not go smoothly and, despite efforts by the HCNM and
pressure by the EU, dragged out almost twelve months, the main resistance coming from the
Reform Party.  Eventually, during a meeting with experts sent by the HCNM at the request of
the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament, the Committee—dominated by more
parliamentarians of the Reform Party—agreed not to submit its own proposals but to accept
the government bill amending the Citizenship Law according to the High Commissioner’s
recommendations.  (A not too substantial change was made to the bill.) The amended text
provides that a stateless child born in Estonia after 1992 will be granted Estonian citizenship
upon application by its parents if it is under the age of fifteen and if its parents are stateless and
have legally resided in Estonia for at least five years prior to the moment the application is
made.  On 8 December 1998, the bill was adopted by parliament and will enter into force on
12 July 1999.  As a result, citizenship can be conferred in a simplified way to about 6,500
stateless children born in Estonia.
The problems surrounding this issue are probably an indication of the strength of the emotions
which are involved in the Estonian-Russian inter-ethnic relationship and also of the insecurity
of a still fragile nation.  Apparently, granting citizenship even to a relatively small group of
non-Estonian children (about 6,500 in all) without a language test (although they will be
obliged to learn the Estonian language at school) raised acute fears of irreversible,
fundamental changes in society to the detriment of Estonians.
e.  Aliens’ legislation
According to Estonia’s 1993 Law on Aliens, an alien is defined as a person who is not a
citizen of Estonia, i.e. a citizen of another state or a stateless person.  The majority of non-
citizens in Estonia are ethnic Russians.  The law provided a one-year period during which non-
citizens who came to Estonia prior to 1 July 1990 and were permanent residents of the former
Estonian SSR could apply for temporary residence permits.  They could also apply for
permanent residence at the same time.  Following delays and confusion in implementation as
well as international criticism, including comments from the HCNM, the application deadline
was extended several times.  As of 1 January 1997, the number of those who had received
temporary residence status was given as 335,368.
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As described above, it was the issue of the status of aliens which in 1993 demonstrated how
the relationship between the Estonian Government and the ethnic Russian minority could
quickly worsen because of basic distrust, lack of information and measures which were not
well thought through.  Initially, the High Commissioner had not made recommendations
regarding aliens’ legislation as a new law was in preparation.  After the tense stand-off
between the central authorities and local authorities in the Russian-dominated Northeast of
Estonia was resolved through mediation by the High Commissioner, Van der Sto l wrote a
letter to the President on 1 July 1993, in which he expressed his opinion that the draft law
should not be promulgated in its present form and suggested amendments, most of which were
incorporated into the new law.
One of the contentious issues the HCNM raised on a number of occasions was the issuance of
aliens’ passports, a necessity for those non-citizens of Estonia who wanted to travel to other
states.  He addressed some unclarities in the law regarding those travel documents and the
procedure by which they could be obtained and argued that all aliens should have the right to
apply for such a passport.  He also pointed out that the introduction on a larger scale of alien
passports could help to avoid a situation in which an increasing number of non-citizens would
apply for Russian citizenship in order to solve their travel problems, even if they intended to
continue to live in Estonia, an argument he also used when expressing concern over the delays
in the process of issuance of aliens’ passports.  In response, the Estonian Government decided
to enlarge the categories of people eligible to receive an alien’s passport by those who
possessed permanent registration in the former Estonian SSR and did not have a valid passport
or a similar document.  At the request of the Estonian Government, the HCNM appealed to all
OSCE states who had not yet recognised the Estonian Alien’s Passport as a legal travel
document to do so “at their earliest convenience.”120
Residence and employment permits for aliens was another source of unrest among the non-
citizen population of Estonia and remained so even after its revision by the Riig k gu on 8 July
1993.  Initially, the requirement that non-Estonian residents who had entered the country
before 1 July 1990 had to apply for residence permits under the new Law on Aliens was
interpreted by them to mean that they would have to remain non-citizens.  After the revision,
the Law on Aliens provided for the possibility of permanent residence permits for persons
who settled in Estonia prior to 1 July 1990 and who continued to reside in Estonia on the basis
of permanent registration in the former Estonian SSR.  However, since those persons would
only be granted temporary residence permits, which after a period of three years would be
exchanged for permanent residence permits, fears arose that acquired rights might be
endangered during the period of temporary residence.  (In the event, the Government started
issuing permanent residence permits sooner.)  These fears included possible negative
consequences affecting the right to work, to pensions and other state support payments, to
participate in the privatisation process and to family reunification.  In both cases, the
Government assured Van der Stoel that these fears were groundless and accepted his
recommendation to improve the clarity of the law on these issues.
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4.  Reactions by the Governments
After all the international attention to the contentious human rights situations in Estonia and
Latvia, the declarations by the HCNM referred to above were naturally very welcome.  The
first reaction by the Estonian and Latvian Governments was therefore positive.  The Estonian
Government remarked that “the High Commissioner [had] demonstrated great knowledge and
a clear understanding of the complex situation in our country” and that he had “compiled what
we deem to be a fair and accurate analysis of the current situation, together with valuable
recommendations for its improvement.”121
The initial response by the Latvian Government (18 April 1993) was also positive, noting that
“Most of your conclusions appear to be reasonably grounded, especially those concerning the
lack of a new citizenship law in Latvia.”  The Latvian Foreign Minister did not fail to point out
that the situation the HCNM studied was “a consequence of the long years which Latvia
suffered under Soviet occupation.”
Nevertheless, thereafter the continuous attention by the HCNM was not always welcomed by
the Estonian and Latvian Governments, and there were even times when the HCNM was not
welcome, although he was never refused access. In general, the Latvian Government seems to
have been slower in responding than its Estonian counterpart and less inclined to make
concessions, perhaps because Latvians felt more threatened in their identity than the
Estonians.  (The non-Latvian population was larger in proportion to the Latvian population
than the non-Estonian to the Estonian population.)  In both cases, however, changing policies,
amending legislation and monitoring developments required continuous attention by the High
Commissioner and numerous follow-up visits and discussions.
Estonian Foreign Minister Ilv s gave a brief look behind the scenes when in April 1997 he had
the following to say to the OSCE Permanent Council: “Estonia became one of these regions
[of OSCE attention] for reasons unconnected to its own actions, and quite honestly, we were
in no way thrilled to see this imposed upon us.”  However, the Minister’s final judgement is
very positive: “Fortunately, a great deal has changed since that time.  And here we would like
to commend and recommend to others the work of the High Commissioner.  Over the course
of several years, Mr. Max van der Stoel’s judicious suggestions have been of great use to us in
making Estonia a successful European country in handling minority affairs.”122
The Estonian Government had also learned how to use the High Commissioner’s attention to
its advantage in its continuous public-relations struggle with the Russian Federation.  Minister
Ilves announced to the Permanent Council that the Government had decided to circulate the
High Commissioner's recommendations and Estonia's response to each of them, “so that
everyone may ascertain for themselves how Estonia has followed those suggestions.  Thus,
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notwithstanding the confidentiality within which the High Commissioner works according to
his mandate, the practical results of his work will be visible and verifiable to all.  Nevertheless,
from time to time voices can be heard which claim that Estonia has refused to follow the
suggestions of the High Commissioner.  This may be simply due to an unwillingness to keep
abreast of the current situation, or it may also be a deliberate attempt to weaken the institution
of the High Commissioner.”123
At the time of Minister Ilves’ intervention before the Permanent Council Estonia had already
accepted most recommendations by the High Commissioner.  Since then, matters have
progressed.  In 1997 a Minister for Inter-Ethnic Relations was appointed, which drew praise
from Van der Stoel as a demonstration of the importance the Government attached to the inter-
ethnic issue.124  Another welcome development was the adoption on 10 February 1998 of
Estonia’s integration strategy—a government plan.  According to a resolution of the
President’s Roundtable of 10 March 1998, it aims at the reduction of the number of stateless
persons in Estonia and a focus of its aliens’ policy on children and young people.  A notable
exception to these positive developments was the resistance to the suggestion regarding the
conferral of citizenship on stateless children born in Estonia—an issue which has only recently
been resolved.
Generally, the impression seems to be that with the adoption by the Estonian Parliament of
amendments to the Citizenship Law simplifying the granting of citizenship to stateless
children, Estonia has now implemented most, if not all, HCNM recommendations.  On 9
December 1998, the EU issued a statement in which it welcomes the amendments and
“acknowledges that Estonia has now fulfilled the OSCE recommendations with regard to
citizenship.”125  The High Commissioner himself seems to have indicated that he does not see
the need for additional recommendations—at least with regard to the Citizenship Law.
However, the focus will now shift more towards the actual and continuing implementation of
the recommendations.
The overall relationship between the High Commissioner and the various Latvian
governments has also had its ups and downs.  While all stated repeatedly that they took the
recommendations of the HCNM seriously, at times there seem to have been more frictions
than with the Estonian Government.  However, over the past few years, Foreign Minister
Valdis Birkavs in his replies has given the impression of real appreciation for the work of Van
der Stoel.  Moreover, in an address to the North Atlantic Council on 6 May 1998—over a year
after Minister Ilves’ remarks quoted above—he referred to the “useful collaboration” with
HCNM Van der Stoel: “thanks to his tireless efforts and pointed advice, my Government was
able to make profound changes in an endeavour to achieve a more stable and integrated
society within Latvia.”  (A reflection, inter alia, of the difficulties the Government still faced
at that moment with regard to amending Latvia’s citizenship legislation, he warned that “I
wish also to stress that in adopting the recommendations made, we trust that the goal posts will
                                                                
123 Idem.
124 Letter of 21 May 1997 to Minister Ilves.
125 Issued in Brussels and Tallinn in the afternoon of 9 December 1998.
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not be moved and that other new measures will not now be proposed by international
organisations.”)126
However, these positive comments notwithstanding, it should not be assumed that matters can
be left to themselves.  A case in point is the recent controversy over amendments to the
Estonian Law on Parliamentary Elections, Law on Local Elections and Law on the State
Language.  These amendments introduced the requirement that members of Parliament and
members of local representative bodies possess a knowledge of the Estonian language in
conformity with criteria enumerated in the law, e.g., that they be able to understand the content
of legal acts and ask questions and submit proposals and communicate with the electorate in
Estonian.  These amendments were passed by the Riigikogu on 15 December 1998 and
promulgated by President Meri on 31 December despite an appeal made by High
Commissioner Van der Stoel to reject them.  (There are indications that these measures were
part of a package deal within the Riigikogu which also included the adoption of the law on
stateless children.)  They are to take effect on 1 May 1999, i.e. after the 7 March 1999
parliamentary elections but before the local elections planned for the Autumn.
In a letter to the President of 19 December 1998,127 the HCNM  argued that the required
knowledge of written and spoken Estonian as a condition for being a member of the Riigikogu
or a local governmental council was “in accord neither with the Estonian Constitution [which,
he wrote, “stipulates no linguistic requirement as a condition to vote or to stand for office”]
nor with Estonia’s international obligations and commitments”, in particular Article 3 of
Protocol I of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 25 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  He also drew attention to the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 1990 OSCE
Copenhagen Document.  Moreover, Van der Stoel wrote, the promulgation of the amendments
“would not constitute a constructive contribution to the national integration process.”
This controversy would seem far from over.  According to the OSCE Mission to Estonia,
several Russian-speaking members of parliament were considering turning to the Office of the
Legal Chancellor to have the constitutionality of the provisions examined.  It also reported that
the full text of the letter of 19 December was published on 4 January 1999 in the Russian-
language daily Estonija.128  (As a result, there have been articles in Estonian newspapers
accusing the HCNM of collusion with Moscow.)  In the second week of January 1999, the
legal adviser of the HCNM and other experts travelled to Tallinn to discuss these matters with
the authorities from a legal point of view.  It seems that the EU is also discussing the matter
with the Estonian authorities.
                                                                
126 Text at “http://www.mfa.gov.lv/MFA/PUB/RUNAS/VB/Vb980506.htm”.
127 Although on 11 September 1998 the HCNM had stated in writing his intention not to come forward
with new proposals regarding the Law on Citizenship if the Riigikogu were to amend that law as requested,
that did not preclude him from commenting on new legislative initiatives if he thought it necessary. The letter
of 19 December 1998 by the HCNM to President Meri is reproduced in Annex 4.
128 OSCE Mission to Estonia, Spot Report 1/99 (4 January 1999).
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VI.  THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND LITHUANIA
In marked contrast to Estonia and Latvia, the inter-ethnic situation in Lithuania has been much
less tense. During his first and only visit to Lithuania from 21 to 23 January 1993 HCNM Van
der Stoel found no domestic or international tensions to speak of.  As the situation has
remained relatively relaxed, the High Commissioner has not returned for follow-up visits to
Lithuania.  In general, it seems that Lithuania has reacted promptly and favourably to
recommendations by international organisations in the area of human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to national minorities.
Importantly, the demographic situation in this south-western Baltic state is quite different from
those in Estonia and Latvia with the non-Lithuanian component of the population not
exceeding twenty percent, mainly ethnic Poles (9%) and Russians (8%).  The Government of
Lithuania had decided to solve the citizenship question on the basis of free choice of
citizenship, the so-called “zero option”. All permanent residents, except Soviet military and
security personnel and their families, could acquire Lithuanian citizenship regardless of
nationality, political views, duration of residence, or knowledge of the Lithuanian language.
The vast majority of permanent residents seemed to have opted for Lithuanian citizenship in
the period in which that choice had to be made (November 1989 – November 1991).  The new
Citizenship Law which was adopted in December 1991 introduced the following requirements
for naturalisation after that period: at least 10 years’ residence in Lithuania, fluency in the state
language and knowledge of the Constitution.  Citizenship was granted automatically to those
who had it before 15 June 1940 and to their descendants.
An important factor contributing to the absence of international tension has been the attitude
of the Polish Government, which in conversations with the HCNM and in its behaviour
showed itself quite aware of the historical delicacy of its relationship with its Lithuanian
neighbour.  In addition, most persons belonging to the Polish minority appeared to have a
political orientation more towards communist Moscow circles—as had become apparent in
their positive reaction to the coup of 1991—than to Warsaw.
Van der Stoel made only one recommendation.129  He noted that the problem of citizenship for
members of the Russian and Polish minorities had been virtually resolved.  In his analysis, the
relationship between the various population groups seemed on the whole to be harmonious,
even though a number of desiderata apparently remained unfulfilled.  Van der Stoel had heard
complaints of the Polish minority concerning registration procedures for regional elections.  In
that connection, as in Estonia and Latvia he recommended the creation of the office of an
Ombudsman which would have as its main task to address in a non-judicial way complaints
concerning administrative decisions and practices.  To make the suggestion more acceptable,
Van der Stoel referred to the model of the office of Ombudsman as it had developed in the
Scandinavian countries.  Such an office would serve the population as a whole, but it could
also play a useful role in addressing complaints concerning administrative decisions and
practices relating specifically to members of the Russian and Polish minorities.
                                                                
129 Letter of 5 March 1993 to Foreign Minister PovilasGylys.
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Foreign Minister Gylys thanked the HCNM for his “sympathetic evaluation” of the situation
in Lithuania but did not embrace his recommendation.  With regard to the suggestion to create
the office of an Ombudsman, the Minister referred to Article 73 of the Lithuanian Constitution
according to which offices of Seimas “controllers” would be established with the mandate to
“examine complaints of citizens concerning the abuse of powers by and bureaucracy of, State
and local government officers (with the exception of judges).  Controllers shall have the right
to submit proposals to the court to dismiss guilty officers from their posts”.  According to the
Minister,  the drafters of the Constitution had been “very impressed” by the Scandinavian
experience of Ombudsmen activities, and Article 73 was an attempt to reflect this.  Article 73
also stated that the competencies of the “controllers” “shall be established by law”.  The
Minister expressed confidence that Parliament would “not allow [the adoption of this law] to
be delayed”.  He promised that as soon as the first draft would appear, it would be sent to the
HCNM for his comments.130  (It is unclear whether this has indeed happened.)
                                                                
130 Reply of 16 April 1993.
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CONCLUSION
After six years of High Commissioner Van der Stoel’s involvement in Estonia and Latvia,
quite naturally the question of what the effect has been arises.  Regarding his primary task, has
he prevented or helped prevent, directly or indirectly, a situation or a development towards a
situation in Estonia or Latvia in which violence would have been likely or even probable?  It
has almost become commonplace to state that the results of conflict prevention are impossible
to measure because, after all, who knows whether violence would have broken out if this or
that measure or range of measures had not been taken?  Not much easier to answer is the
question of what is needed to stave off an escalation before the point is reached beyond which
it cannot be stopped anymore.  In Macedonia, inter-ethnic Albanian-Macedonian tensions are
such that violence could be around the corner, depending on developments in and around
Kosovo.  This may well become an important test-case to see whether and under which
circumstances the involvement of an international mediator such as High Commissioner Van
der Stoel does make a crucial difference in a really volatile situation.
In Estonia or Latvia, no such explosive situations exist or existed, except perhaps for the brief
crisis of the Summer of 1993 in the Estonian Northeast.  With regard to that crisis the answer
would seem to be that, indeed, the involvement of the High Commissioner, acting as the
representative of the OSCE, was instrumental in dissolving a potentially dangerous stand-off
and preventing an escalation with unforeseeable consequences.  As far as the overall situation
is concerned, it would seem fair to say that Van der Stoel has been able to convince various
Estonian governments about the implications of the continued presence of (ethnically) non-
Estonians, in particular Russians, in Estonia and of the necessity of finding an equilibrium
between the desire to protect Estonian identity and the need to give non-Estonians a fair deal.
As a result, a good number of amendments to minority-relevant legislation and administrative
practices have been adopted which address many fundamental concerns on the part of non-
citizens, in particular with regard to the naturalisation process and the status of aliens.
However, this may be seen to be a necessary but not sufficient step towards overall
integration.  Of equal significance (and possibly of greater concern and potential tension) are
issues of maintenance and development of identity both for majorities and minorities,
including issues of education and use of language.  Concerns in these areas remain.
Overall, as the recent developments with regard to the election laws in Estonia have
demonstrated, the legal foundations for a modus vivendi between majority and (national)
minorities have yet to be completed.  Even then, they will need amendments in constant
adaptation to an evolving society and there will be the possibility, even the probability, of
conflicts of interest.  Moreover, the political-psychological undercurrents which are the results
of fifty years will not disappear in five years, nor will they simply be neutralised by acts of
parliament.  Thus, it remains an open question not only whether the legislation and
administrative rules and regulations, once enacted, will be faithfully and fully implemented at
all relevant levels of government, also under governments of a more ethnic Estonia-centric
persuasion, but also whether the minorities in question will make use of the possibilities
offered—in particular with regard to naturalisation—and will accept that the steps taken are
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sufficient.  Moreover, in all likelihood the Russian Federation in the coming years will
continue to take an active interest in the domestic Estonian and Latvian situations, if only for
geostrategic reasons.  Under these circumstances, the OSCE and its High Commissioner
should continue to play its conflict-prevention role in Estonia and in Latvia in one way or
another for a number of years to come.
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ANNEX 1
Mandate of the High Commissioner
The following is the full text of the mandate of the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities as contained in the Helsinki Document 1992, Decisions, Chapter II.  Since its
adoption, there have been no amendments to the mandate.
II
CSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES
(1) The participating States decide to establish a High Commissioner on National
Minorities.
Mandate
(2) The High Commissioner will act under the aegis of the CSO and will thus be an
instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.
(3) The High Commissioner will provide "early warning" and, as appropriate, "early
action" at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority
issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the
judgement of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict
within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating
States, requiring the attention of and action by the Council or the CSO.
(4) Within the mandate, based on CSCE principles and  commitments, the High
Commissioner will work in confidence and will act independently of all parties
directly involved in the tensions.
(5a) The High Commissioner will consider national minority issues occurring in the State
of which the High Commissioner is a national or a resident, or involving a national
minority to which the High Commissioner belongs, only if all parties directly involved
agree, including the State concerned.
(5b) The High Commissioner will not consider national minority issues in situations
involving organized acts of terrorism.
(5c) Nor will the High Commissioner consider violations of CSCE commitments with
regard to an individual person belonging to a national minority.
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(6) In considering a situation, the High Commissioner will take fully into account the
availability of democratic means and international instruments to respond to it, and
their utilization by the parties involved.
(7) When a particular national minority issue has been brought to the attention of the
CSO, the involvement of the High Commissioner will require a request and a specific
mandate from the CSO.
Profile, appointment, support
(8) The High Commissioner will be an eminent international personality with
long-standing relevant experience from whom an impartial performance of the
function may be expected.
(9) The High Commissioner will be appointed by the Council by consensus upon the
recommendation of the CSO for a period of three years, which may be extended for
one further term of three years only.
(10) The High Commissioner will draw upon the facilities of the ODIHR in Warsaw, and
in particular upon the information relevant to all aspects of national minority questions
available at the ODIHR.
Early warning
(11) The High Commissioner will:
(11a) collect and receive information regarding national minority issues from sourc
described below (see Supplement paragraphs (23)-(25));
(11b) assess at the earliest possible stage the role of the parties directly concerned, the nature
of the tensions and recent developments therein and, where possible, the potential
consequences for peace and stability within the CSCE area;
(11c) to this end, be able to pay a visit, in accordance with paragraph (17) and Supplement
paragraphs (27)-(30), to any participating State and communicate in person, subject to
the provisions of paragraph (25), with parties directly concerned to obtain first-hand
information about the situation of national minorities.
(12) The High Commissioner may during a visit to a participating State, while obtaining
first-hand information from all parties directly involved, discuss the questions with the
parties, and where appropriate promote dialogue, confidence and co-operatio
between them.
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Provision of early warning
(13) If, on the basis of exchanges of communications and contacts with relevant parties, th
High Commissioner concludes that there is a prima facie risk of potential conflict (as
set out in paragraph (3)) he/she may issue an early warning, which will be
communicated promptly by the Chairman-in-Office to the CSO.
(14) The Chairman-i -Office will include this early warning in the agenda for the next
meeting of the CSO.  If a State believes that such an early warning merits prompt
consultation, it may initiate the procedure set out in Annex 2 of the Summary of
Conclusions of the Berlin Meeting of the Council ("Emergency Mechanism").
(15) The High Commissioner will explain to the CSO the reasons for issuing the early
warning.
Early action
(16) The High Commissioner may recommend that he/she be authorized to enter into
further contact and closer consultations with the parties concerned with a view to
possible solutions, according to a mandate to be decided by the CSO.  The CSO may
decide accordingly.
Accountability
(17) The High Commissioner will consult the Chairman-in-Office prior to a departure for a
participating State to address a tension involving national minorities. The
Chairman-in-Office will consult, in confidence, the participating State(s) concerned
and may consult more widely.
(18) After a visit to a participating State, the High Commissioner will provide strictly
confidential reports to the Chairman-in-Office on the findings and progress of the
High Commissioner's involvement in a particular question.
(19) After termination of the involvement of the High Commissioner in a particular issue,
the High Commissioner will report to the Chairman-in-Office on the findings, results
and conclusions.  Within a period of one month, the Chairman-in-Office will consult,
in confidence, on the findings, results and conclusions the participating State(s)
concerned and may consult more widely.  Thereafter the report, together with possible
comments, will be transmitted to the CSO.
(20) Should the High Commissioner conclude that the situation is escalating into a conflict,
or if the High Commissioner deems that the scope for action by the High
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Commissioner is exhausted, the High Commissioner shall, through the
Chairman-in-Office, so inform the CSO.
(21) Should the CSO become involved in a particular issue, the High Commissioner will
provide information and, on request, advice to the CSO, or to any other institution or
organization which the CSO may invite, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter
III of this document, to take action with regard to the tensions or conflict.
(22) The High Commissioner, if so requested by the CSO and with due regard to the
requirement of confidentiality in his/her mandate, will provide information about
his/her activities at CSCE implementation meetings on Human Dimension issues.
SUPPLEMENT
Sources of information about national minority issues
(23) The High Commissioner may:
(23a) collect and receive information regarding the situation of national minorities and the
role of parties involved therein from any source, including the media and
non-governmental organizations with the exception referred to in paragraph (25);
(23b) receive specific reports from parties directly  involved regarding developments
concerning national minority issues. These may include reports on violations of CSCE
commitments with respect to national minorities as well as other violations in the
context of national minority issues.
(24) Such specific reports to the High Commissioner should meet the following
requirements:
- they should be in writing, addressed to the High Commissioner as such and signed
with full names and addresses;
- they should contain a factual account of the developments which are relevant to
the situation of persons belonging to national minorities and the role of the parties
involved therein, and which have taken place recently, in principle not more than
12 months previously. The reports should contain information which can be
sufficiently substantiated.
(25) The High Commissioner will not communicate with and will not acknowledge
communications from any person or rganization which practises or publicly
condones terrorism or violence.
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Parties directly concerned
(26) Parties directly concerned in tensions who can provide specific reports to the High
Commissioner and with whom the High Commissioner will seek to communicate in
person during a visit to a participating State are the following:
(26a)  governments of participating States, including, if appropriate, regional and  local
authorities in areas in which national minorities reside;
(26b) representatives of associations, non-governmental organizations, religious and other
groups of national minorities directly concerned and in the area of tension, which are
authorized by the persons belonging to those national minorities to represent them.
Conditions for travel by the High Commissioner
(27) Prior to an intended visit, the High Commissioner will submit to the participating State
concerned specific information regarding the intended purpose of that visit. Within
two weeks the State(s) concerned will consult with the High Commissioner on the
objectives of the visit, which may include the promotion of dialogue, confidence and
co-operation between the parties.  After entry the State concerned will facilitate free
travel and communication of the High Commissioner subject to the provisions of
paragraph (25) above.
(28) If the State concerned does not allow the High Commissioner to enter the country and
to travel and communicate freely, the High Commissioner will so inform the CSO.
(29) In the course of such a visit,subject to the provision of paragraph (25) the High
Commissioner may consult the parties involved, and may receive information in
confidence from any individual, group or organization directly concerned on questions
the High Commissioner is addressing.  The High Commissioner will respect the
confidential nature of the information.
(30) The participating States will refrain from taking any action against persons,
organizations or institutions on account of their contact with the High Commissioner.
High Commissioner and involvement of experts
(31) The High Commissioner may decide to request assistance from not more than three
experts with relevant expertise in specific matters on which brief, spe ialized
investigation and advice are required.
(32) If the High Commissioner decides to call on experts, the High Commissioner will set
a clearly defined mandate and time-frame for the activities of the experts.
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(33) Experts will only visit a participating State at the same time as the High
Commissioner.  Their mandate will be an integral part of the mandate of the High
Commissioner and the same conditions for travel will apply.
(34) The advice and recommendations requested from the experts will be submitted in
confidence to the High Commissioner, who will be responsible for the activities and
for the reports of the experts and who will decide whether and in what form the advice
and recommendations will be communicated to the parties concerned.  They will be
non-binding. If the High Commissioner decides to make the advice and
recommendations available, the State(s) concerned will be given the opportunity to
comment.
(35) The experts will be selected by the High Commissioner with the assistance of the
ODIHR from the resource list established at the ODIHR as laid down in the
Document of the Moscow Meeting.
(36) The experts will not include nationals or residents of the participating State concerned,
or any person appointed by the State concerned, or any expert against whom the
participating State has previously entered reservations. The experts will not include
the participating State's own  nationals or residents or any of the persons it appointed
to the resource list, or more than one national or resident of any particular State.
Budget
(37) A separate budget will be determined at the ODIHR, which will provide, as
appropriate, logistical support for travel and communication. The budget will be
funded by the participating States according to the established CSCE scale of
distribution. Details will be worked out by the Financial Committee and approved
by the CSO.
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ANNEX 2
Correspondence of the HCNM - Latvia, April 1993
HCNM letter of 6 April 1993
Dear Mr Minister,
Following my visits to Latvia on 15-20 January and 1-2 April 1993, I take the liberty of
sending you, annexed to this letter, a number of recommendations concerning mainly the non-
Latvian population of your country. I restrict myself to this question because I would go
beyond my mandate if I would comment on other problems concerning your country. On the
other hand, I can assure you that, in making these suggestions, I have been fully aware of the
political and psychological background of many of the questions I am referring to. I think for
instance of the long years Latvia suffered under Soviet occupation, the bitterness caused by
what is perceived as a deliberate policy of Russification during those years, and your concerns
about the continued, though greatly reduced, presence of Russian troops on your territory. I
also recall the way you and your colleagues have repeatedly stressed the determination of the
Latvian people firmly to establish its national identity in various field. Finally, I have
registered the concern felt by the Latvian Government about the situation of the Latvians
living on the territory of the Russian Federation.
I am fully aware of the fact that there is no evidence of persecution of the non-Latvian
population since the reestablishment of Latvian independence, and moreover, that there have
virtually been no incidents pointing to interethnic violence. My hope is that the ideas I am
submitting to you - inspired as they are by the various CSCE documents to which Latvia,
together with all other CSCE participating States, has subscribed - can contribute to the
promotion of harmony and dialogue between the various population groups in your country.
When I drafted my recommendations, my basic assumption has been that, though a number of
non-Latvians have returned to their native country and more might follow, it would be
unrealistic to expect that such a return will be on a massive scale. The great majority will
probably prefer to stay in Latvia, partially because they have been living there for a long time
or have been born there, and partially because they feel that they have no prospect of finding
homes en jobs if they would move to the Russian Federation or any other CIS state.
During my visits, I was told by officials of the Citizenship and Immigration Department that
according to their estimates the number of non-Latvians that will have acquired Latvian
citizenship before June and who will therefore be able to participate in the parliamentary
elections scheduled for that month will not exceed 50%. As 98% of all non-Latvians have
been living in Latvia for more than 5 years and 93% even for 16 years or more and as the
prospects of finding jobs and apartments in the Russian Federation or other CIS republics have
to be considered very small, it can be assumed that most of those who so far have not been
able to acquire Latvian citizenship will sooner or later apply for it. This conclusion is
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supported by official data which show that per March 22nd out of a total of 617,443 persons
registered as inhabitants of Latvia who are not Latvian citizens 593,008 want to acquire
citizenship.
On the basis of my conversations, I assume that the Government of Latvia, confronted with
this situation, will not decide to oblige this group or parts of it to leave the country. Although
every Government has the right to remove from its territory persons whose continued presence
could be damaging to vital interests of the state, it is also obvious that expulsions on a massive
scale would be contrary to generally accepted international humanitarian principles and would,
moreover, probably have very serious international repercussions.
From the point of view of harmonious interethnic relations, it would in my view also be
undesirable that Latvia would insist on such high requirements for citizenship that a great
number of applicants would not be able to meet them. As a consequence, the percentage of
citizens of Latvian origin would be higher and that of citizens of non-Latvian origin lower then
would be the case if Latvia would follow a more liberal line.  However, the disadvantage of
such a very strict policy would quite probably be that there would be considerable
dissatisfaction amongst the very many who would then not have the chance of obtaining
Latvian citizenship. Even though, as you pointed out in your speech before the UN
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on February 15, these persons would be free to
choose their place of employment, to engage in professional activities and private enterprise,
to receive pensions and unemployment benefits and to have access to health care and housing,
they would not have the right to make their views known by participating in the election
process.
Another solution would be that Latvia would restrict itself to requirements for citizenship
which, broadly speaking, would not go beyond those used by most CSCE states. In my
recommendations I have tried to elaborate this formula in somewhat greater detail. It is my
opinion that such a policy would be the most effective way to ensure the loyalty of non-
Latvians towards Latvia. I do understand that the Latvian Government feels the need,
especially in the light of the demographic changes brought about in Latvia during the years of
the Soviet period, to take measures to strengthen the Latvian identity. However, there are other
instruments than the citizenship law to promote and strengthen the Latvian identity, especially
in the cultural, educational and linguistic fields.
I am fully aware that the policy I advocate does not only require an effort on the part of the
Latvian Government, but equally a contribution on the part of the non-Latvian population.
Adaptation to the reality of the re-emergence of Latvia as an independent state requires that at
any rate those who have not yet retired from work and who do not yet speak the Latvian
language make a determined effort to master that language to such a degree that they are able
to conduct a simple conversation in Latvian. In this way they would, without having to
sacrifice their cultural or linguistic identity, provide a convincing proof of their willingness to
integrate. The required psychological adaptation to the reality of the re-emergence of Latvia as
an independent state would also be enhanced if it would be possible to ensure rapid
implementation of paragraph 15 of the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration, calling for "the
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conclusion, without delay, of agreements, including timetables, for the early, orderly and
complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic states."
In a policy aiming at the promotion of continued harmonious relations between Latvians and
the non-Latvian population the most important element would, of course, be the passing of
legislation which demonstrates that the Latvian Government is taking the interests of the non-
Latvians living in Latvia fully into account. It would be especially conducive to harmonious
relations if the present uncertainty amongst non-Latvians about the forthcoming legislation
concerning their position in Latvia could be brought to an end as soon as possible. In this
connection, I should like to mention the need for the speedy adoption of a citizenship law.
Experience shows that lack of information about government policies can lead to serious and
perhaps often unnecessary misunderstandings. Against this background, I am making some
recommendations concerning the problem of communication with the non-Latvian
communities.
In my view, it could also greatly facilitate the relationship with the non-Latvian population, if
the Latvian Government would decide to set up the office of a "National Commissioner on
Ethnic and Language Questions". His or her main task would be to look into complaints by
persons which, in their view, have not been correctly dealt with, to signal possible diverging
interpretations of the same laws by different authorities, and in a general sense, to act as a go-
between to the Government and the community concerned. In this way, he or she could help to
prevent tensions from arising or, if they already exist, to reduce or eliminate them. I would be
willing to offer you any assistance you might find desirable in developing this idea.
In addition to the recommendations I have mentioned, you will find some others which are
self-explanatory in the text which follows. Even though Russians constitute the largest non-
Latvian population group in Latvia, I use the term "non-Latvian" in my recommendations in
order to make it clear that they do apply equally to Russians and non-Russians amongst the
non-Latvian population of your country.
Finally, permit me, Mr Minister, to thank you once again for the kindness shown to me during
my visits to Latvia. I was especially struck by the openness with which you and your
colleagues answered my questions.
Yours sincerely,
(Max van der Stoel)
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Latvia – Conclusions and recommendations
1) A new citizenship law should be speedily adopted, in order that the conditions for
naturalisation be clearly defined.
2) Children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless should be granted Latvian
citizenship taking into account Article 24, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness.
3) As far as the requirement of a minimum period of residence in Latvia is concerned, such
period should not exceed 5 years. This is the period frequently adopted by states and in
this case there do not seem to be good reasons not to adopt it. In terms of non-citizens
eligible for citizenship, the difference between 16, 10 or 5 years period of required
residence is not great (93 percent, 96 percent and 98 percent respectively).  Adopting a
shorter period would also be a good decision for psychological reasons, since it would be
seen as proof of the Government's determination to resolve the citizenship issue.
4) For those who are already residents of Latvia, the period of 5 years mentioned in
Recommendation No 3 should be reckoned from the date they came to Latvia or were
born there, whichever may be the case.
5) In order to reduce as much as possible the uncertainty prevailing in the non-Latvian
communities, once applicants fulfil the legal requirements for citizenship they should be
granted citizenship without delay and no further waiting period should be introduced.
6) If the new citizenship law would include a requirement that basic elements of the
Constitution should be known, the requirement should be formulated in such a way that
different interpretations are not possible. Generally speaking, the requirement that basic
elements of the Constitution be known should not be a major obstacle to the acquisition of
citizenship.
7) Whatever language requirements are chosen, they should not exceed the level of
"conversational knowledge" which was required by the Supreme Council Resolution of 15
October 1991. The Government, administrative authorities and courts should be lenient in
the application of this requirement as far as citizenship is concerned.
8) A clause exempting elderly persons (60 years and over) and disabled persons from
language requirements when they apply for citizenship should be introduced.
9) It should be made explicit that any eventual requirement that applicants should have a
steady legal income in order to qualify for citizenship should not apply to unemployed
persons.
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10) If certain persons would be explicitly excluded by law from acquiring citizenship, the law
should stipulate that the validity of any allegation that a person would be the subject of
such exclusion would, if denied, have to be established by court, in order to forestall any
attempt at improper use of such provision.
11) In enacting or implementing legal provisions concerning nationality, citizenship or
naturalisation, Articles 1 (3) and 5(d) of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, prohibiting any discrimination based on national or
ethnic origin, have, of course, to be fully respected.
12) The effective and uniform implementation of the citizenship law should be assured by
appropriate review or appeals procedure. A rejection of an application for citizenship, for
instance because of a failure to meet language requirements, should not preclude the
applicant from applying again. These procedures should be widely publicize .
13) In the end, a number of persons will neither qualify for citizenship, nor have the status of
permanent residents. The High Commissioner would recommend that humanitarian
considerations and reasonableness be the guiding principles regarding those persons.
14) The legislation on language should be made more precise. E.g. Article 7 of the Language
Law of 5 May 1989, as amended on 31 March 1992, appears to require the use of the
Latvian language in the internal affairs of all private enterprises and organizatio s.
However, this had not been the intention of the legislator.
15) The Latvian authorities should enhance their efforts at helping non-Latvians to acquire a
reasonable level of knowledge of the Latvian language. More use should be made of the
mass media, in particular television.
16) The Government should enhance its efforts aimed at informing the non-Latvian population
about the legislation, regulations and practical questions which concern citizenship,
language requirements et cetera. An information brochure providing this information
should be written in such a way that it can be comprehended even by persons with no
more than a basic education. The brochure should be distributed in large numbers, not only
to households but also to places where larger groups of non-Latvians can be expected,
such as certain factories, associations and the like. Second, posters and placards could be
positioned at public places and in streets, carrying the most important passages from the
brochure or a summary of the main points.
17) The office of a "National Commissioner on Ethnic and Language Questions" should be
established. The National Commissioner should be competent to take up any relevant
complaint which he/she considers to require further attention with any government agency.
He/she would have to actively find out about uncertainties and dissatisfaction involving
minorities, act speedily in order to clarify grey areas, answer to questions within a
specified period of time (e.g., two months) and finally act as a channel for information and
as a go between to the Government and the minorities in Latvia.
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The National Commissioner should have the general confidence of all parties concerned.
If it should prove impossible to find one person who would meet this criterion, then a
commission of three could be established to do the same thing (one Commissioner with
two deputies, a triumvirate, like many ombudsman offices are structured).
18) In general, it is recommended that the Government consistently implement a visible policy
of dialogue and integration towards the non-Latvian population, which should incorporate
the above-mentioned recommendations.  In the High Commissioner's opinion, early
government action in this regard is indispensable.
The Latvian National Minorities department, which is currently part of the Ministry of
Justice, should be made an independent body, so that it could act with more authority.
Latvian reply of 18 April 1993
Dear Mr. van der Stoel,
The Republic of Latvia Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Office of
the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and has the honour to refer to the
following issue.
We appreciate the great interest expressed by the CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities which is carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Helsinki
Document, 1992 and the Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting, 1992,
as well as your great personal interest, as expressed during your visit of April 1 & 2, 1992,
concerning the current situation in Latvia which is a consequence of the long years which
Latvia suffered under Soviet occupation.
The evaluations and suggestions which you have provided in your introductory letter and the
attached conclusions and recommendations are carefully being examined by the respective
Government institutions of Latvia.
Most of your conclusions appear to be reasonably grounded, especially those concerning the
lack of a new citizenship law in Latvia. As you know, the current Latvia Supreme Council is a
transitional parliament and has no legal mandate under the restored 1922 Latvia Constitution
to change the body of Latvia citizenship through naturalization or other means. This legal
mandate will be held by the newly-elected Sa lma which is being elected on June 5 and 6
1993. Thus, one of the most urgent tasks for the new Saelma will be to adopt a complete
citizenship law which will include provisions for naturalization. Your recommendations will
certainly be presented to the Saelma members.
Regarding the proposal for the establishment of a "National Commissioner on Ethnic and
Language Questions" Office, it should be noted that this question involves careful examination
and probably cannot be implemented until the new Government is formed. However, we
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would like to mention that the existing system of human rights protection in Latvia has not
been exhausted and provides, in our opinion, sufficient avenues for problem-solving in this
area.
We are confident that our further cooperation with the CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities will be fruitful and valuable for all CSCE member states.
Please accept my highest considerations.
Sincerely yours,
(Georgs Andrejevs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Latvia)
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ANNEX 3
Documents on the 1993 Crisis in Estonia
Statement of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr Max van der Stoel
(Tallinn, 12 July 1993)
On July 10-12, 1993, I visited Estonia again. I had meetings with President Meri and Prime
Minister Laar.  I also met with the chairmen of the City Councils of Narva andSillamaee, Mr
Chuikin and Mr Maksimenko, and with Mr Yugantsov and Mr Semjonov of the
Representative Assembly. Main subject of discussion was the development of the situation
now that the Riigikogu has adopted a revised version of the Law on Aliens and the President
has decided not to promulgate the law on education, but to send it back to Parliament for
further consideration.
In conversations with the Prime Minister, I received the following assurances:
1) The Estonian Government is determined to develop a relationship of friendship and
cooperation with the Russian community  in Estonia, expecting loyalty towards the
Republic of Estonia in return.
2) To promote such a relationship, the Government of Estonia is determined to have an
intensive and continuous dialogue with representatives of the Russian community, during
which they will be free to raise any question about which they feel concerned.
3) The fact that non-Estonian residents who entered the country before 1 July 1990 must
apply for residence permits under the new law on aliens, must not be interpreted as an
obligation for the residents concerned to accept that in future there will be no other
possibility for them than to remain non-citizens. In principle, any non-citizen residing in
Estonia for more than two years can apply for citizenship of Estonia if he or she wishes to
do so.
4) As far as the requirements for citizenship are concerned, the Government intends to take
concrete steps in the near future to ensure that the recommendations made on this subject
by the High Commissioner on National Minorities last April will be put into effect.
Directives will be issued to ensure that the language requirements will not exceed the
ability to conduct a simple conversation in Estonian and that the requirements will be even
lower for persons over 60 and invalids.
5) The Government of Estonia wants to restate categorically that it does not intend to start a
policy of expulsion from Estonia of Russian residents. This also applies to persons who
are unemployed. As far as former members of the Soviet armed forces and their families
are concerned, humanitarian considerations will determine the attitude of the Estonian
Government. Those who received some kind of military training during their university
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studies but have not actively served in the Soviet armed forces will not be considered as
belonging to the category of former members of the Soviet armed forces.
6) The Government of Estonia will implement article 8:4 of the law on aliens, concerning
aliens' passports in such a way that no complicated procedures are needed in order to get
an alien's passport.
7) The Government of Estonia will examine the possibilities of facilitating the naturalisation
of residents non-citizens who will be presented as candidates in the forthcoming local
elections.
8) The Government of Estonia intends to make a special effort to improve the economic
situation in Northeastern Estonia.
9) The Government of Estonia, even though considering the referenda planned in Narva and
Sillamaee as illegal, will not use force to prevent them from being held.
10) The statement of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE of June 30 supporting the
continuous involvement of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia is
welcomed by the Government of Estonia.
In conversations with the representatives of the Russian community in Estonia I received the
following assurances:
1) The representatives of the Russian community on their part will play an active and
constructive role in the dialogue with the Government.
2) They will fully respect the Constitution and the territorial integrity of Estonia.
3) Moreover, the presidents of the City Councils of Narva and Sillamaee assured me that if
the question of the legality of the referenda planned in Narva and Sillamaee is submitted to
the National Court, they will abide by its ruling.
I am aware that in the dialogue between the Government and the Russian community many
difficult questions still have to be solved. However, I am also convinced that the assurances I
have received provide a solid basis for a fruitful dialogue.
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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA - COMMUNIQUE
'The Law on Aliens', adopted by the Riigikogu on June 21, has given rise to various
interpretations. The situation that has emerged around it is partly accounted for by inadequate
information among the Russian-speaking population or, here and there, by misinformation.
In this connection the President of the Republic deems it wise to announce that before taking a
decision in favour or against the promulgation of the said Law, he will apply to the Council of
Europe, the CSCE and other organisations for an expert opinion in order to obtain an unbiased
professional assessment of the said Law. The President of the Republic refers to the
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, which grants everybody rights and liberties in
conformity with European norms.
In order to secure domestic peace and a balanced policy essential for the reconstruction of the
Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic has decided to initiate a Round Table of
non-citizens and ethnic minorities. The Round Table will present the conclusions of their
discussions to the President in written form. Depending on the nature of each problem, the
President of the Republic will forward them for examination to the Council of Europe, the
CSCE, the Riigikogu, or for settlement by the pertinent state bodies.
At Kadriorg June 25, 1993
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Annex 4
Correspondence of the HCNM - Estonia, December 1998
HCNM Letter of 19 December 1998 to President LennarMeri
Excellency,
I have the honor to address you with regard to the adoption by the Riigikogu on 15 December
1998 of an amendment to the Estonian Laws on Parliamentary Elections, Local Elections and
the State Language according to which “knowledge of written and spoken Estonian” would be
required in order to be a member of the Riigikogu or a local governmental council.
As you know, I issued a statement recently confirming my intention not to come forward with
new proposals regarding the Law on Citizenship after adoption by the Riig kogu of the recent
amendments to that Law in relation to otherwise stateless children.  I wish to reiterate that this
is still my intention. However, the issue at hand relates to the use of language, about which I
have made a number of recommendations in the past.  It is against this background that I
should like to submit to you the following considerations.
In my view, the amendment to the Estonian Laws on Parliamentary Elections, Local Elections
and the State Language is in accord neither with the Estonian Constitution nor with Estonian's
international obligations and commitments. Moreover, I believe that promulgation of the law
amending the Laws on Parliamentary Elections, Local Elections and the State Language
would not constitute a constructive contribution to the national integration process.
With regard to the law applicable in Estonia, the amendment in question is in my view not
compatible with specific requirements of the Constitution which, inter alia, stipulates no
linguistic requirements as a condition to vote or to stand for office. Moreover, the Constitution
stipulates the supremacy of international treaties binding on Estonia over Estonian laws which
contradict such obligations. This leads me to draw your attention to the requirements of Article
3 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which stipulate that the will of the People
(i.e. the citizenry) is to be the basis of government. It is to be noted that Article 3 of Protocol 1
of the European Convention on Human Rights is to be read in conjunction with Article 14 of
the same Convention which forbids discrimination on the basis of language. Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is even  more explicit in providing as
follows:
“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
“(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
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“(b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of
the electors;
“(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.”
The destinations mentioned in Article 2, referred to above, are as follows:
“1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, olor, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” (emphasis added)
It is clear from the above that there is to be absolutely no distinction regarding the language of
a candidate for election nor any “unreasonable restriction”; in relation to this last point, it is
further to be noted that only prescription of a minimum age, legal competence, non-
incarceration and non-judicial service are generally accepted as the very few reasonable
restrictions.
The rationale for the above-noted absolute entitlement to stand for office to be enjoyed by
citizens (without unreasonable restriction) is rooted in the essence of the democratic process,
i.e. they should be essentially free to decide among themselves who they would wish to elect,
and each citizen should be equally free to present themselves for elections. Linguistic or other
proficiency is fundamentally irrelevant to this process or objective. Should the electorate so
choose, they should be free to elect persons who may enjoy their confidence but who may not
in the opinion of others possess relevant or desirable skills or abilities, much less purported
“proficiencies”. The critical matter is that the elected person is deemed by the electorate
(through the secret ballot) to represent them. There is no other matter of relevance. To require
anything more would be to interfere with the basic democratic process and undermine the will
of the people as the basis of government.
Permit me to note that the above arguments are not merely academic. By way of citing more
extreme examples, the current Minister of Education in the United Kingdom, Mr. David
Blunkerr, is blind; as such, he is unable to read or write in the English language.  As another
example, a current Member of Parliament in Canada is deaf, as such, he is unable to read or
write in either of the official languages, nor is his spoken “proficiency” necessarily at the
highest level (he is provided with a signer to assist him in his work as Member of Parliament).
In neither of two aforementioned cases may it be said that the elected persons do not serve
their electorate, the citizenry at large or the State: in each case they have been specifically
elected by their immediate constituents according to the constituency system.  Indeed, in the
British case, the person has been included within the Government and accorded Ministerial
responsibilities. By reference to these extreme cases, it is evident a fortiori that “proficiency”
in the State language cannot be a requirement for public service as an elected representative
and that to require such could interfere with the will of the people being the basis of
government.
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Allow me, Mr. President, also to draw your attention to the requirements of the Council of
Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities which provides in
Article 4 that States Parties are “to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to
promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality
between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. In this
respect, they shall take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belonging to
national minorities.”  In addition, Article 15 of the same Convention provides that “The
Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons
belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in
particular those affecting them.” In my view, excluding such persons without “proficiency” in
the Estonian language would in effect exclude them from the possibility to participate in the
most fundamental aspects of political life and public affairs, i.e. to stand for elected office.
Finally, as High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, permit me to draw your attention also to the requirements of (among
other relevant OSCE documents) the 1990 Copenhagen Document through which Estonia has
committed itself to the principle of fully democratic elections and to ensure the effective
participation of persons belonging to national minorities in public decision-making processes.
In my view, to exclude persons without “proficiency” in the Estonian language from holding
elected office would be in contradiction with Estonia's OSCE commitments.
As a consequence of the above arguments, I appeal to you not to promulgate the amendments
in question as adopted by the Riigikogu. In so doing, I wish to stress that maintaining the fully
open and democratic nature of the Estonia representative political institutions in no way
undermines the preservation and protection of the Estonian language. I am confident that the
Republic of Estonia possesses, within the wide scope of its sovereignty the means to protect,
promote and develop the use of the Estonian language—including through prescription of the
Estonian language as the language of Parliament and public administration in general. I am
fully committed to supporting the Republic of Estonia in this objective.
Yours respectfully,
(Max van der Stoel)
